CHAPTER I

THE FIRST DECADE AFTER WORLD WAR II
(1945-1955) (U)

1. (C) The Early Occupation

Immediately after V-E Day the major concern of the U.S. Army in Europe was the withdrawal of forces, both to deploy intact units and personnel to the Pacific Theater, where the war continued, and also to return personnel to the United States for demobilization. The latter process accelerated after Japan's surrender. and by early 1946, when it had become clear that a small occupation force would suffice to control the German populace, the forces in Europe were reduced drastically. Among the units deleted were antiaircraft artillery battalions.

By 1948 the major threat in Europe was obviously not the defeated German enemy, but the former Soviet ally, who seemed intent upon expanding his worldwide influence. When the United States Government decided to reorganize and strengthen the two major tactical units in Europe -- the 1st Infantry Division and the Constabulary -- one of the first priorities was to establish an antiaircraft capability. Accordingly, in October

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1 EUCOM Hist Div, Reorganization of Tactical Forces, V-E Day to 1 January 1949, pp. 7-30, passim; and pp. 39, 42, 49, 51. CONF.
1948 the European Command\(^2\) activated the 48th Antiaircraft Artillery (AAA) Automatic Weapons (AW) Battalion and assigned it to the 1st Infantry Division. In November 1948 EUCOM activated the 552d AAA Gun Battalion (90-mm), assigned it to the U.S. Constabulary, and attached it to the 1st Infantry Division for operational control.

Until the buildup of the line of communications (LOC) across France beginning in 1950, these two battalions remained the only antiaircraft artillery units in the European Theater.

2. (S) The Need for More Air Defense

With the LOC buildup underway, in March 1950 EUCOM asked for three additional air defense battalions — one 90-mm gun and two automatic weapons units. The five battalions, including the two already assigned, would protect the Rhine General Depot at Kaiserslautern, which at the time was EUCOM’s most important logistic installation; the new communications zone (COMZ) headquarters and supply installations in the Verdun area; and the Rhine River bridges.

These, of course, were bare minimum requirements. An LOC extending from the Atlantic coast to the German border would need better protection, particularly of supply dumps and the major port areas. (See Map 1.) The air defense of the Rhine River bridges would also have to be improved, for no temporary means of crossing — whether floating bridges, ferries, or other craft — could compare in traffic capacity to the five permanent steel bridges in the U.S. sector.

Although the Department of the Army could provide no immediate relief because of the greater need for forces in the Pacific to meet the invasion of South Korea, it planned to increase the air defense forces in the European theater to 12 battalions by the end of FY 1951 and to 14 by the end of FY 1952.\(^5\)

\(^2\)Then known as EUCOM; when the unified U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) headquarters was established on 1 August 1952, the theater army headquarters was designated as U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR). UNCLASS.

\(^3\)EUCOM Trp Asg No 29, 18 Oct 48. UNCLASS.

\(^4\)EUCOM Trp Asg No 31, 24 Nov 48. UNCLASS.

\(^5\)TS Suppl to EUCOM Anl Narr Rept, 1950, pp. 10, 14, 91. TS (info used SECRET).
The buildup in Europe did proceed rapidly despite the high demands of the Korean conflict. By December 1951 the European Command had 1 AAA brigade headquarters (the 34th), 2 AAA groups -- 1 consisting of 1 gun and 3 AW battalions, and the other of 1 AW and 3 gun battalions -- and 1 AW battalion assigned to each of the 5 divisions, for a total of 13 AAA battalions. (See Table 1.) By the end of 1952 another group headquarters had been added, and reorganizations had realigned the battalions to provide a better balance of guns and automatic weapons in each group. One group consisted of 2 AW and 3 gun battalions, while the other 2 groups had 2 battalions of each type. The 5 divisions still had 1 AW battalion each, so that EUCOM had a total of 18 AAA battalions. At this time the gun battalions were equipped with 90-mm antiaircraft guns and -- except for two towed 40-mm battalions -- all AW battalions had self-propelled 37-mm or 40-mm rapid-fire cannon. (See Table 2.)

By mid-1955, when planning for the integration of air defense missiles began to overshadow the deployment of units equipped with guns, only one more battalion had been added, although reorganizations and redesignations had significantly altered the appearance of the 34th AAA Brigade. There were then 4 groups, 3 with 4 battalions each, and 1 with only 2 battalions. Five AW battalions had been converted to gun battalions and equipped with the new 75-mm "Skysweeper" weapons system, and all the remaining AW battalions (1 each in 2 of the groups and the 5 divisions) had been equipped with the new M-42 self-propelled twin 40-mm automatic cannon. (See Table 3.)

For a comparison of the characteristics of the three conventional antiaircraft artillery weapons systems, see Table 4.

3. (C) Training

Lacking adequate range facilities in the U.S. Zone of Occupation, early in 1949 EUCOM made arrangements for its two AAA battalions to fire at the

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6Seventh Army Comd Rept, 1951, pp. 7-8. SECRET (info used UNCLASS. FOUO).

7Seventh Army Comd Rept, 1952, Incl 4. SECRET (info used UNCLASS. FOUO).

8(1) Seventh Army Anl Hist Rept, FY 1955, pp. 572-73. SECRET. (2) USAREUR Sta Lists, 30 Sep and 31 Dec 55. CONF.
Table 1

Air Defense Organization in 1951

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>24th AAA Brigade</th>
<th>260th AAA Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22d Sig Radio Det</td>
<td>63d AAA Gun Bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>504th AAA Op Det</td>
<td>67th AAA Gun Bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>443d AAA AW Bn (SP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>95th AAA Gun Bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>184th AAA Op Det</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12th AAA Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>62d AAA AW Bn (SP)</th>
<th>63d AAA Gun Bn</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>73d AAA AW Bn (SP)</td>
<td>67th AAA Gun Bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91st AAA AW Bn (Mbl)</td>
<td>443d AAA AW Bn (SP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>552d AAA Gun Bn</td>
<td>95th AAA Gun Bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>505th AAA Op Det</td>
<td>184th AAA Op Det</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49th RCAT Det</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Divisional AAA units were assigned as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>48th AAA AW Bn (SP)</th>
<th>1st Infantry Division</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>94th AAA AW Bn (SP)</td>
<td>2d Armored Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46th AAA AW Bn (SP)</td>
<td>4th Infantry Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>899th AAA AW Bn (SP)</td>
<td>28th Infantry Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>169th AAA AW Bn (SP)</td>
<td>43d Infantry Division</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Seventh Army Artl Cptd Rept, 1951, Arty Sec, pp. 7-9. CONF (Info used FOUC).
Air Defense Organization in 1952

34th AAA Brigade - Mannheim
504th Op Det - Mannheim

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>8th AAA Group - Wiesbaden</th>
<th>12th AAA Group - Knielingen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5th AAA AW BN (40-mm) - Wiesbaden</td>
<td>73d AAA AW BN (40-mm SP) - Knielingen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63d AAA Gun BN (90-mm) - Wiesbaden</td>
<td>91st AAA AW BN (40-mm Mgl) - Ludwigsburg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>443d AAA AW BN (37-mm SP) - Wiesbaden</td>
<td>552d AAA Gun BN (90-mm) - Karlsruhe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>633d AAA Gun BN (90-mm) - Biebrich</td>
<td>717th AAA Gun BN (90-mm) - Karlsruhe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>509th Op Det - Wiesbaden</td>
<td>505th Op Det - Karlsruhe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>242d AAA Group - Mannheim</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27th AAA AW BN (40-mm Mgl) - Kaiserslautern</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45th AAA Gun BN (90-mm) - Kaiserslautern</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62d AAA AW BN (37-mm SP) - Mannheim</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67th AAA Gun BN (90-mm) - Worms</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95th AAA Gun BN (90-mm) - Sandhofen</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>302d Op Det - Mannheim</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1st Infantry Division - 48th AAA AW BN (40-mm SP) - Erbach

2d Armored Division - 94th AAA AW BN (40-mm SP) - Wackernheim

4th Infantry Division - 46th AAA AW BN (50-mm SP) - Hanau

28th Infantry Division - 399th AAA AW BN (37-mm SP) - Neulingen

3d Infantry Division - 169th AAA AW BN (57-mm SP) - Munich

SOURCE: Seventh Army Cmd Rept, 1952, Arty Sec, Incl h. CONF (Info used P000).
Putlos range on the coast of Hohwachter Bay, east of Kiel, in the British Zone of Occupation. The first firings took place in the spring of 1949.9

This arrangement remained in effect until late 1952, when the British had to relocate their range to Todendorf, some 20 miles from Putlos, to avoid interference with civil aviation. An agreement signed on 10 November 1952 provided for the British to furnish land at the Todendorf range for U.S. use and for EUCOM to construct the needed facilities at its own expense. The construction of camp facilities for 900 men and firing installations to accommodate a battalion amounted to DM 3,175,000, and the U.S. share of access-road costs was another DM 1 million — all paid out of the "occupation cost" budget with funds provided by the Federal Republic of Germany (F.R.G.). The U.S. portion of the range opened on 15 June 1953 and remained in use for the firing of 75-mm and 90-mm AAA guns until the last unit was inactivated in 1960. The range was formally returned to the control of F.R.G. authorities effective 1 May 1961 under an agreement signed by USAEUR and the Federal Ministry of Defense.

The Todendorf range was not satisfactory because weather limited its use to approximately 6 out of 12 months, and the expense of moving battalions to and from the range was high. Because of these disadvantages, USAEUR made every effort to find suitable range facilities in southern Germany, but without success so far as the larger guns were concerned. Beginning in 1952, however, Seventh Army units used ranges at the Grafenwoehr and Hohenfels training areas for machinegun and automatic-weapons live-fire AAA training. USAFE furnished towed aerial target support.10

9 EUCOM Anl Narr Rept, 1949, p. 373. CONF (info used UNCLAS).

10 (1) Hq EUCOM/USAEUR Comd Rept, 1952, pp. 199-200, 208. (2) USAEUR Anl Hist Rept, 1 Jan’53 – 30 Jun 54, pp. 231–33, 236–37. Both SECRET (info used CONF). (3) USAEUR Anl Hist, 1960, pp. 89-90. TS (info used UNCLAS). (4) Fonecon, Mr. B. H. Siemon, USAEUR ODCEOFS Mil Hist Ofc, with Mr. R. Husmann, USAENGCOMEUR Real Estate Ofc, Bremerhaven, 2 Sep 70. UNCLAS.
Table 3

Air Defense Organization in 1955

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1st AAA Group – Kaefertal</th>
<th>8th AAA Group – Wiesbaden</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7th AAA Gun Bn (75-mm) – Mannheim</td>
<td>5th AAA Gun Bn (75-mm) – Wiesbaden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62d AAA AW Bn (SP) – Mannheim</td>
<td>63d AAA Gun Bn (90-mm) – Wiesbaden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67th AAA Gun Bn (90-mm) – Worms</td>
<td>91st AAA Gun Bn (75-mm) – Biebrich</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95th AAA Gun Bn (90-mm) – Sandhofen</td>
<td>4/43d AAA Gun Bn (75-mm) – Wiesbaden</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>12th AAA Group – Kaiserslautern</th>
<th>69th AAA Group – Knielingen/Karlsruhe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25th AAA Gun Bn (90-mm) – Kaiserslautern</td>
<td>73d AAA AW Bn (SP) – Knielingen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27th AAA Gun Bn (75-mm) – Kaiserslautern</td>
<td>552d AAA Gun Bn (90-mm) – Knielingen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40th AAA Gun Bn (90-mm) – Kaiserslautern</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45th AAA Gun Bn (90-mm) – Kaiserslautern</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2d Armored Division – 94th AAA AW Bn (SP) – Wackernheim</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4th Infantry Division – 46th AAA AW Bn (SP) – Hanau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Infantry Division – 47th AAA AW Bn (SP) – Munich</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th Infantry Division – 42d AAA AW Bn (SP) – Nellingen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th Infantry Division – 43d AAA AW Bn (SP) – Erlangen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: (1) USAEUR StaLists, Sep-Dec 1955. CONF. (2) Seventh Army Anl Hist Rept, FY 1956. SECRET (info used FOUO).
Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>M2 40-mm</th>
<th>75-mm Skysweeper</th>
<th>90-mm MLA1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Elevation (power)</strong></td>
<td>85°</td>
<td>85°</td>
<td>80°</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(manual)</td>
<td>87°</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Depression (power)</strong></td>
<td>-3°</td>
<td>-6°</td>
<td>-5°</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(manual)</td>
<td>-5°</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Horizontal Range</strong></td>
<td>5,200 yds</td>
<td>14,000 yds</td>
<td>10,980 yds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Vertical Range</strong></td>
<td>5,100 yds</td>
<td>7,000 yds</td>
<td>11,273 yds*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rate of Fire</strong></td>
<td>240 rds/min</td>
<td>45-55 rds/min</td>
<td>23-28 rds/min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Target Tracking</strong></td>
<td>Optical</td>
<td>Radar/Computer</td>
<td>Radar/Computer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Radar Range</strong></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>24,000 yds</td>
<td>100,000 yds</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* with 30-second fuse.

**SOURCE:**
1. TM 9-2300, Standard Artillery and Fire Control Materiel, 7 Feb 68.
2. FM 44-69, Service of the Piece, 75-mm AA Gun Mount T69 Skysweeper, 21 Nov 51.
3. FM 44-2, Artillery Employment, Automatic Weapons M42/M55, Nov 68. All UNCLASS.
4. (S) Air Defense Authority and Responsibility

a. The Allied Right of Self-Defense. In the immediate postwar period there could be no question that the Allies, by virtue of Germany's unconditional surrender, had full authority to take any military measure necessary to guarantee the safety and security of their forces on German territory. The Convention on Relations between the Federal Republic and the Three Powers,11 signed in May 1952, confirmed the right of an Allied military commander to take action appropriate for the protection of his forces, to include the use of armed force. In 1954, in connection with the Allied agreement to terminate the occupation status of the three western zones of Germany, Federal Chancellor Konrad Adenauer formally reaffirmed this right of self-defense.12 The right of self-defense naturally included the right of air defense and provided the legal basis for stationing U.S. air defense units in the Federal Republic.

b. Seeds of Conflict. The question of command and control of air defense elements within the U.S. armed forces was not so clear cut and remained a matter of disagreement throughout the gun era. Until 1951 the assets available in Europe were far too few to provide any meaningful level of defense or to create any real problems of control. With the activation of Seventh Army in November 1950, and the subsequent buildup of forces including AAA units -- during 1951, questions of air defense command and control became more urgent.

Under the general alert order (GAO) of September 1950, EUCOM assigned to its Army combat element (later designated Seventh Army) wartime responsibility for the employment of antiaircraft artillery and gave priority to establishing air defense restricted areas to protect the Rhine River bridges. The Air Force combat element (later designated Twelfth Air Force) was to employ aircraft in an air defense role, again giving first priority to the protection of the Rhine River bridges. The Army and Air Force were to coordinate their air defense plans and, in an initial step toward NATO

11 The three powers occupying the western zones -- France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. UNCLASS.

PHOTO 2: 90-mm Antiaircraft Gun with Fire Control System
integration, were to be prepared to release their tactical units on order to
the operational control of the Allied commander in chief.\textsuperscript{13}

In February 1951 EUCOM published new alert orders that, in effect,
repeated the above provisions but changed designations to reflect the recent
reorganization in Europe. Seventh Army was to be responsible for the AAA
defense of the Rhine River bridges, and Twelfth Air Force was to be
responsible for the fighter-interceptor aspect of that defense. Twelfth
Air Force protested that Air Force elements should control the fire of AAA
units in areas where Army control of the guns might lead to interference with
the Air Force aircraft. EUCOM ruled that the GAO's basic provisions would
remain unchanged; however, Seventh Army and Twelfth Air Force were to
coordinate in establishing fire defense restricted areas at the Rhine River
bridges, in which areas the Army commanders would control AAA fire. In all
other areas of the U.S. zone of responsibility the Twelfth Air Force
commander would control the fire of AAA units through an antiaircraft
operations center.\textsuperscript{14}

In 1952 a realignment of headquarters established the U.S. European
Command (USEUCOM) as the unified headquarters, and USAREUR and USAFE as its
Army and Air Force component commands. The NATO command structure in Europe
paralleled the new U.S. structure. At the highest level, USEUCOM had as its
counterpart a multinational joint headquarters known as Supreme Headquarters,
Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE). Subordinate to SHAPE were multinational
joint regional commands, the one that included Germany and France being
designated Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT); subordinate to AFCENT
were three multinational single-service commands -- AIRCENT, LANDCENT,
and NAVCENT. LANDCENT was composed of the Northern and Central Army Groups
(NORTHAG and CENTAG), and AIRCENT of the Second and Fourth Allied Tactical
Air Forces (TWOATAF and FOURATAF). The commander in chief of USEUCOM
(USCINCUS) was simultaneously the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR);
at the lower level, the USAREUR and USAFE commanders in chief also commanded
CENTAG and FOURATAF, respectively.

\textsuperscript{13} TS Suppl to EUCOM Anl Narr Rept, 1950, pp. 41-42, 166. TS (info used
SECRET).

\textsuperscript{14}(1) EUCOM Comd Rept, 1951, pp. 47-48, 65-66, 177. SECRET. (2) TS Suppl
to EUCOM Comd Rept, 1951, pp. 2-3. TS (info used SECRET). (3) USAREUR Anl
Narr Rept, 1950, pp. 43, 46. SECRET (info used CONF).
By Presidential directive, SACEUR would have operational control over all U.S. forces in Europe, although all routine employment, training, and administration would remain within existing U.S. command channels. SACEUR would exercise full operational control over his assigned NATO forces only in wartime; in peacetime his headquarters was concerned primarily with war and contingency planning and combined training activities.  

In light of these developments, and to establish clear lines of authority in air defense matters, in 1952 USAFE recommended that a single air defense commander control all air defense resources, regardless of nationality or service. In the central area this should be the Twelfth Air Force commander in peacetime and the FOURATAF commander in wartime. In contrast, both USAREUR and Seventh Army headquarters insisted that the ground commander should retain control of the guns in the army area of responsibility.  

A year later the question arose again, this time in the context of integrating the air defense forces of the various nations under NATO control. In March 1953 LANDCENT requested USAREUR’s comment on SHAPE’s proposed antiaircraft standing operating procedures (SOP). If adopted, the proposed SOP would enable air defense elements of any service of any NATO nation to participate in the air defense mission for which any other nation might be responsible. Although LANDCENT considered the objective of the proposal acceptable, the plan was not sufficiently flexible. An army commander should be given every reasonable opportunity to defend himself, and for this reason control of air defense should be decentralized. The new plan, according to LANDCENT, would substantially reduce the army commander’s ability to protect himself by eliminating the flexibility in control procedures that was essential for successful antiaircraft artillery operations. Centralized control of antiaircraft artillery at tactical air force level would be slow and would not allow the full exploitation of this means of air defense. These deficiencies would be especially dangerous in nuclear war, since in most cases friendly aircraft would be unable to intercept enemy attacks before they reached the combat zone. Finally, to "hold fire" for the protection of friendly aircraft was neither necessary nor desired. Given normal information from the tactical air force or sector operations centers, artillery commanders could protect friendly aircraft while engaging attackers in the same general localities.

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15 For a detailed discussion of the U.S. and NATO command relationship, see TS Suppl to EUCOM/USAREUR Cmd Rept, 1952, Chs. 1 and 2. TS (info used SECRET). NOFORN.

CINCUSAREUR supported the LANDCENT position with additional reasons. For instance, the SHAPE proposal did not consider that organic communication facilities within an antiaircraft organization were specifically designed to operate independently, if necessary, in accomplishing their mission. Since air defense effectiveness depended on the immediate transmission of orders to firing units, any controls that delayed the issuance of fire orders would jeopardize air defense.

After considering the different approaches to air defense procedures, SACEUR decided that prearranged operational control of AAA fire within field army areas should be the joint responsibility of the field army commander and the supporting air force commander. When AAA units were in communication with air control centers through AAA operations rooms, minute-to-minute control of AAA fire would be vested in the supporting air commander, who would exercise control through a duty air controller.

In May 1954 SHAPE distributed a new air defense proposal, which USAREUR considered an improvement over the earlier one, but still restrictive. Under the proposal, responsibility for the air defense of military installations on national territory outside the land combat zone might be so changed that the United States would have to defend all U.S. military installations in France, not only the airfields.

No change was made at the time, but in the spring of 1955 the NATO Standing Group assigned responsibility for the air defense of all U.S. installations in France to the United States. USAREUR's study of the problem during the remainder of 1955 revealed that no units could be released to defend the LOC installations, but the deployment of missiles in the near future would permit some defense of the LOC with Nike battalions.17

While these developments were taking place, the disagreements between the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force continued. Through 1954 and the first half of 1955 Seventh Army urged the establishment of gun-defended areas in which local ground commanders would fire at all aircraft under specific predetermined conditions. Twelfth Air Force insisted that aircraft be positively identified as hostile before being engaged and wanted complete freedom for friendly aircraft, which meant that in the Air Force-controlled areas the Army AAA capability would be severely limited.

These differences could not be resolved in 1955 and, in fact, continued well into 1956.18

17USAREUR Anl Hist Repts, 1 Jan 53-30 Jun 54, pp. 351-54; FY 1955, p. 21, and TS Suppl, p. 10. All info used SECRET.

18USAREUR Anl Hist Rept, FY 1956, pp. 181-87. SECRET. NOFORN.
5. (S) Air Defense Priorities

a. Initial Concepts. As in the case of so many other types of equipment, there was never enough air defense capability to protect all the targets in the European area that commanders might have wished to defend. For example, as was noted above, EUCOM considered it highly desirable in 1950 to provide air defense for at least the major ports and some of the depots along the LOC across France and in the fall of 1951 prepared preliminary plans to protect the French west-coast ports.

At approximately the same time, in October 1951 U.S. and French military representatives discussed the coordination of matters of joint interest arising from their occupation responsibilities in Germany. The French proposed a delineation of air defense responsibility for Rhine River bridges: The bridge at Karlsruhe would be a joint responsibility of both armies; the French would assume responsibility for the bridge at Koblenz and those south of Karlsruhe; and the U.S. Army would protect the bridges between Koblenz and Karlsruhe located at Mainz, Worms, Frankenthal, and Mannheim, as well as the U.S. swing bridges at Gernsheim and Germersheim (see Map 2). The U.S. commander concurred, and the 34th AAA Brigade deployed its battalions so as to provide 1 gun battery and 4 AW batteries at Mainz, 2 gun battalions and 2 AW batteries in the Worms-Frankenthal-Mannheim area, 1 gun battalion and 3 AW batteries at Karlsruhe, and 1 AW battery at each of the swing bridges.19

With the Rhine River bridges thus protected, in the spring of 1952 EUCOM conducted surveys to determine the air defense requirements for certain LOC installations in France. The additional battalions and a group headquarters arriving in Europe from March to July 1952 were needed to defend the Kaiserslautern depot and to improve the defenses already established at the Rhine bridges. Since no surplus capability was available for France, the plan was abandoned in September 1952.20

b. Further Planning. In December 1954 the Department of the Army asked for a list of U.S. installations in Europe that required better air defense. USEUCOM was to establish a priority list, together with the number and type of AAA units necessary for each installation, the existing plans for deploying antiaircraft units, the urgency of the need for additional AAA units as compared with other requirements, and other pertinent information.


When USEUCOM and component command representatives met in January 1955, neither the Army nor the Air Force was willing to yield its position concerning the top priority installations.

USAREUR held that the Rhine River bridges should be at or near the top of the priority list in order to maintain the westbound flow of noncombatant traffic across the Rhine and the eastbound flow of troop supplies. The bridges were also essential for removing railroad rolling stock from West Germany and evacuating supplies and equipment during a retrograde movement.

Conversely, the Air Force held that its ten airbases in Germany should head the list. Since it was essential to insure the capability of delivering nuclear weapons, all U.S. forces should have the primary objective of protecting the aircraft that carried the weapons and the bases from which they operated.

The two component commands were unable to reconcile their differences, and a second conference held at USEUCOM headquarters produced no solution. For this reason, USEUCOM forwarded its own and USAREUR's priority lists to the Department of the Army for a decision. The USAREUR list, which included the airbases -- although without USAFE's concurrence -- contained 46 installations, the first 10 of which were:

- The Kaiserslautern complex (both USAREUR and USAFE installations);
- The St. Nazaire-Nantes port complex in France;
- The La Rochelle-La Palllice port complex in France;
- The Bitburg-Spangdahlem airbases;
- The Rhine River bridges;
- The Bordeaux port area in France;
- The Hahn airbase;
- The Etain-Chambly airbase in France;
- The Chaumont airbase in France; and
- The Laon airbase in France.

The USEUCOM listing placed the port complexes in France at the lowest priority, thus shifting the Bitburg-Spangdahlem airbases to second position and the Rhine River bridges to third.21

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21 TS Suppl to USAREUR Ant Hist Rept, FY 1955, pp. 3-10. TS (info used SECRET). NOFORN.
The USEUCOM priority listing remained the accepted one until 1957, when
detailed planning for the deployment of Nike missile units rendered the
question of gun defense priorities largely irrelevant. 22

6. (8) Summary

During the first 10 years after World War II, the Army air defense in
Europe was inadequate, and responsibilities remained fragmented. The
deletion of antiaircraft artillery in the immediate postwar period was
not reversed until two AAA battalions were activated in 1948, giving EUCOM
a token Army air defense capability. These two battalions provided at
least symbolic recognition of the need for air defense, but little more.
In 1950 began an improvement that led to an increase in the number of AAA
battalions to 18 by 1952. Two main weapons systems were used: the 90-mm
antiaircraft gun and the 37- or 40-mm rapidfire cannon. By 1955 there
were 19 antiaircraft battalions, and the 75-mm Skysweeper weapons system
had been added to the inventory. However, air defense could be provided
only on a point basis. The available AAA units and interceptor aircraft
were to protect a limited number of targets judged to be of greatest
importance to the mission of the U.S. forces and, later, of NATO.

At an early date there was recognition of the need for international
coordination in the area of air defense. In West Germany, both before
and after the end of the Allied occupation, the U.S., British, and French
forces had the dual responsibility to defend themselves and the territory
of the Federal Republic. In the NATO structure, the partners were not able
to reach complete agreement on command and control of air defense resources
despite earnest initial efforts to do so.

Within the U.S. forces, the question of command and control of Army air
defense units was a point of controversy between USAREUR and USAFE throughout
the gun era. Because antiaircraft resources were insufficient, air defense
priorities had to be established. The order of such priorities, like the
question of command and control, was a source of major disagreement between
USAREUR and USAFE. The solution of these problems was still pending as the
missile era began.

22(1) TS Suppl to USAREUR Anl Hist Rept, FY 1956, p. 13. TS (info used
SECRET). (2) USAREUR Anl Hist Rept, FY 1957, pp. 158-59. SECRET. NOPORN.