7. (S) Background

a. Conversion to Missiles. Planning for the introduction of surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems began in 1955, but the activation of USAREUR's first Nike battalion did not occur until October 1957. Accordingly, while the question of command and control of the Army air defense artillery assets was under discussion, the pending conversion to missiles and their integration into an overall air defense effort had to be taken into consideration. The much greater effectiveness of the missiles, and particularly their range and altitude, introduced new factors into the equation. Along with the U.S. interservice relationships between air and ground commanders and their air defense responsibilities and capabilities, the question of international cooperation among the NATO air defense elements had to be defined while the gun-missile conversions were taking place. Finally, the selection of appropriate locations for the new missile units hinged upon the priorities of targets to be defended. All these closely related issues constantly acted and reacted upon one another to create a complex matrix of causes and effects, effects which in themselves subsequently became new causes leading to yet other effects.

b. The Gun-Defended Area Proposal. As previously mentioned, in 1955 Seventh Army proposed that friendly aircraft should be denied access to the so-called gun-defended areas, where antiaircraft artillery units would automatically engage any aircraft without having to identify it as hostile. Twelfth Air Force, on the contrary, held that all aircraft should be positively identified before engagement except for aircraft taking hostile action. As an essential interim control plan, pending the deployment of the Nike system. The plan proposed two methods of control. The first would be a minute-to-minute control system that would remain in effect so long as communications remained intact. The system would require an Air Force control and reporting center to inform the Army antiaircraft operations center about the location of friendly aircraft operating in the area. Aircraft not identified as friendly would be assumed to be hostile, and the Army antiaircraft units could engage them. The second method would rely on prearranged control.
through the establishment of gun-defended areas as proposed by Seventh Army, but would come into effect only when communications were lost.

USAEC rejected the concept, insisted that minute-to-minute control was the only acceptable procedure for air defense, and recommended the development of a system of communications that would guarantee effective Air Force control of the fire of all air defense weapons. CINCUSAEC further recommended that the commander of the Twelfth Air Force be designated the U.S. air defense commander for all of Central Europe.

Representatives of USEUCOM, USAEUR, USAEC, Seventh Army, and the 34th AAA Brigade met at Heidelberg in June 1956 to discuss the question. At the meeting USAEUR reiterated that the army commander had to be free to use his own weapons to meet any threat to his forces. Any unidentified aircraft would have to be engaged before it could commit a hostile act. During the air defense exercise CARTE BLANCHE held a year earlier the Air Force controllers had been unable to identify 42 percent of the aircraft operating over the Army area, and Twelfth Air Force had admitted that Seventh Army could expect little Air Force assistance in the early days of any conflict.¹

Another significant point was that SAM capabilities would not be fully realized under existing procedures. An integrated air defense plan with realistic rules of engagement would be needed before the Nike battalions deployed to Europe.²

c. NATO Planning Concepts. While these U.S. interservice discussions were taking place, in December 1955 the NATO Military Committee had published a study entitled "Air Defense Command and Control in NATO Europe" (MC 54), which had proposed a concept for a coordinated system of air defense. Allied air commanders, such as Air Chief Marshal Sir Basil Embry -- AIRCENT commander from 1953 to 1956 -- argued that the entire NATO defense structure would be in danger of collapse if a surprise nuclear attack made western Europe untenable as a base for military operations. Under such circumstances, the political argument that rejected international control of air defense as an infringement of national sovereignty would have to be reconsidered. A coordinated international air defense would represent

¹(1) USAEUR Anl Hist Rept, FY 1956, pp. 161-84. (2) Seventh Army Anl Hist Rept, FY 1956, pp. 506-09. Both SECRET.

²USAREUR Anl Hist Rept, FY 1957, p. 155. SECRET.
the most effective use of all available resources by providing an area or "umbrella" protection, rather than the limited "point" protection of a certain number of high-value targets. 3

Early in 1956 USAREUR learned of SHAPE proposals, presumably based on MC 54, to make the appropriate NATO air commander responsible for the air defense of the land combat zone. In addition, USAFE and Twelfth Air Force apparently were developing a plan for the employment of both available and programmed air defense weapons in the forward area of the Federal Republic. USAREUR considered that any such planning should properly be a joint function of both services and on 18 April recommended to USAFE the formation of a joint standing air defense committee for planning and coordination and, simultaneously, recommended to USCINCUSUR that ground commanders be included in NATO air defense planning and receive copies of all SHAPE air defense directives.

CINCUSAFE countered in May that his command should be the sole U.S. contact point for SHAPE air defense planning efforts concerning such problems as the compatibility of planned national electronic environments, the U.S. contribution to a SHAPE early warning system, the integration of German air defense resources into the NATO system, the types, number, and employment of air defense missiles, and the use of nuclear air defense weapons. 4

d. U.S. Nike Plans. The U.S. Army had meanwhile continued with its unilateral plans for the deployment of the Nike missile system to Europe.

(1) System Characteristics. The Nike Ajax version that was first deployed to Europe had a conventional high explosive warhead weighing 533 pounds. The missile system employed three radars: a battery acquisition radar, which could detect approaching aircraft at ranges up to 110,000 meters; a target tracking radar that locked onto targets at ranges up to 92,000 meters and thereafter tracked them automatically; and a missile tracking radar that was coupled with a computer to process tracking data and issue steering commands to the missile, to include a command to detonate. The Nike Ajax

3(1) TAB E, MC 54, 12 Dec 55, sub: Air Defense Command and Control in NATO Europe, to ltr, USCINCUSUR to CINCUSAREUR, 1 Nov 69, sub: Air Defense Responsibilities, ECJF-NATO SECRETS (info used SECRET).
(2) USAFE Hist, 1958, pp. 189-91. SECRET.

4USAREUR Anl Hist Rept, FY 1956, pp. 184-84. SECRET.
missile had a range of 49,400 meters, a maximum altitude of 18,290 meters, and could engage targets traveling at speeds up to 1,500 knots.²

(2) Deployment Plans. The 1955 plans called for the deployment of six Nike Ajax battalions to the Seventh Army area for the protection of major installations and headquarters, the Rhine River bridges, major logistic support facilities in Germany west of the Rhine River, and the Air Force's Hahn-Bitburg-Spangdahlem airfield complex. (See Map 2.) A seventh battalion would defend the vital ports on the west coast of France.

In the spring of 1956 the Department of the Army advised that 10 Nike battalions would be deployed to USAREUR in FY 1958; USAREUR proposed assigning the first 7 of these to Seventh Army, with the remaining 3 to defend COMZ depots and ports in France on an area, rather than a point, defense basis.⁶

By September 1956 Seventh Army had completed its initial plan for the deployment of six Nike battalions of four firing batteries each. This plan called for locating one battalion headquarters each at Worms, Mannheim, and Karlsruhe, with their batteries deployed east and west of the Rhine to protect the forward area and the bridges, and one battalion each at Pirmasens, Baumholder, and Bitburg, with their batteries deployed in the surrounding areas to protect logistic installations and airfields. (See Map 3.) USAREUR approved the concept with one change, directing the relocation of one battery site from the Worms area to the Kaiserslautern area to strengthen the defense of that logistic complex.⁷

8. (S) Major Developments

a. Recommendations of the Joint Committee. In the meantime two significant steps had been taken toward resolution of Army-Air Force differences. First, in response to the USAREUR proposal of 18 April 1956, the joint USAFE-USAREUR air defense committee met on 4 June to

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⁶USAREUR Anl Hist Rept, FY 1956, pp. 185-86. SECRET.

⁷USAREUR Anl Hist Rept, FY 1957, pp. 166-67. SECRET.
discuss the current operational problems pertaining to antiaircraft artillery. Second, also in June, USCINCEUR appointed a special joint committee to study and recommend common policies on command structure, rules of engagement, and air defense priorities. The USCINCEUR committee's report recommended a joint air defense command to control all air defense assets of both Seventh Army and Twelfth Air Force, with operational control of air defense units vested in the Twelfth Air Force commander. The committee also recommended adoption of the USAREUR/Seventh Army deployment proposal for Nike units, and urged that any additional Nike battalions that might become available should protect the Bitburg and Spangdahlem airbases.

As a step toward creation of the desired air defense command, the USCINCEUR committee further recommended the establishment of an interim joint air defense staff, which would be located at the Twelfth Air Force headquarters and headed by an Air Force commander with a USAREUR-appointed deputy. This staff would prepare and submit to USCINCEUR recommendations on outstanding air defense questions, to include in particular the establishment of rules of engagement, determination of additional air defense requirements for the Kaiserslautern-Bitburg-Rhine complex, and proposals for additional areas to be defended and the priorities to be assigned to them.

In August USAREUR concurred in the proposal to adopt its Nike deployment plan, accepted the concept of a joint air defense staff, but rejected the proposal to place Seventh Army's nondivisional air defense assets under the operational control of an Air Force commander.

b. USAREUR's Counterproposals. USAREUR pointed out that the special committee had overlooked the superiority of the Nike system over fighter aircraft. To restrict the firing of Nike missiles, either because of failure to identify targets promptly or because of the improper use of rules of engagement, would impair the effectiveness of the weapon. Also, by employing Corporal, Honest John, and Redstone missiles — in addition to conventional artillery, air defense weapons, and light aircraft -- the Army would require more air space in a combat zone than the Air Force. Nor had the preponderance of Army troops, materiel, and facilities in the combat zone been taken into account. Finally, because of its surface-to-surface capability, the Nike, equipped with conventional or nuclear warheads, would have to be at the disposal of the field commander.

In USAREUR's opinion, the primary functions of a joint air defense staff should be in the areas of coordination and intelligence, not command. The staff, headed by a coordinator, should not prescribe

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6 US Suppl. to USAREUR Adj Hist Rept, FY 1957, pp. 13-14. (SECRET)  UNCLASSIFIED.
the tactical disposition of air defense assets, which would have to remain under the command of Seventh Army and Twelfth Air Force, but should exercise operational control, resolve differences, develop rules of engagement, establish air defense subsectors and appoint coordinators for each, establish or reconcile priorities, recommend allocations of assets for the defense of each area, and establish interservice communications.

USAREUR proposed that the combat zone be divided into sectors generally coinciding with the field army tactical air defense sectors. The sector air defense coordinators would come from either service; their deputies, from the other. Each sector could be divided into subsectors, with the service having the most effective means of air defense and the primary interest in the defended area providing the coordinator.

USAREUR wanted the air defense staff to be an autonomous agency maintained jointly by Seventh Army and the Twelfth Air Force. The air defense coordinator’s decision in operational matters would be final, except for matters of policy, concept, or allocation of means that could not be resolved locally and would have to be referred to USEUCOM or to the next higher NATO air defense staff.

At this point -- November 1956 -- the Secretary of Defense published a memorandum on the missions of the military services in air defense, which established the principle that an overseas theater commander would normally assign responsibility for air defense to his air component commander. Three months later, in February 1957, USEUCOM issued a draft directive delegating air defense responsibility to the Twelfth Air Force commander and calling for the formation of a joint USAREUR/USAFE air defense staff at his headquarters. Seventh Army’s nondivisonal gun battalions -- seven 90-mm and five 75-mm Skysweeper -- would remain under Army command but would be under the operational control of the Twelfth Air Force commander. Priority targets, and the forces to defend them, would be the Kaiserslautern complex, with one 75-mm and four 90-mm battalions; the Bitburg- Spangdahlem airbase complex, with two 75-mm and two 90-mm battalions; the Rhine River bridges, with two 75-mm battalions; and the Hahn airbase, with one 90-mm battalion.  


10USAREUR Anl Hist Rept, FY 1957, pp. 156-59, 162. SECRIT.
c. Realignment of Army Air Defense Elements. Slippage in the
deployment schedule and budgetary restrictions had by this time caused
a revision in Nike plans; the spring 1957 schedule called for USAREUR
to receive six Nike battalions in FY 1958 and another four in FY 1959,
and to obtain the necessary spaces by converting 90-mm gun battalions
to the new missile system. USEUCOM proposed that the Nike battalions
arriving in FY 1958 should come under the Twelfth Air Force commander's
operational control for the defense of the Kaiserslautern and Bitburg-
Spangdahlem complexes.

USAREUR held that the Seventh Army commander would thus be
deprived of any viable air defense capability; he would lose all but
two 75-mm Skysweeper and seven 40-mm automatic weapons battalions,
and if a proposed division reorganization was implemented, he would
also lose the five organic divisional AW battalions.

Accordingly, in May 1957 USAREUR proposed a realignment of air
defense elements based on a geographic division of Germany into a
forward zone east of the Rhine River, to be defended by Seventh Army's
34th AAA Brigade, and a rear area west of the river, to be defended by
the 32d AAA Brigade in a theater army role.\footnote{In a DA-directed reduction, the 75-mm gun battalions of the
32d AAA Brigade had been inactivated and the brigade headquarters and
headquarters battery transferred from the United Kingdom to Kaiserslautern
in April 1957. (USAREUR Arm Hist Rept, FY 1957, pp. 9, 163. SECRET
[info used UNCLASS].)}

As implemented in July, the USAREUR reorganization plan divided
the air/defense assets as follows:

\begin{verbatim}
32d AAA Brigade (Theater Army)
1st AAA Group (Mannheim-Kaeferthal)
  5th AAA Bn, 75-mm (Wiesbaden)
  67th AAA Bn, 90-mm (Worms)
  91st AAA Bn, 75-mm (Biebrich)
  95th AAA Bn, 90-mm (Mannheim-Sandhofen)
12th AAA Group (Kaiserslautern)
  25th AAA Bn, 90-mm (Kaiserslautern)
  27th AAA Bn, 75-mm (Kaiserslautern)
  40th AAA Bn, 90-mm (Kaiserslautern)
  45th AAA Bn, 90-mm (Kaiserslautern)
\end{verbatim}
34th AAA Brigade (Seventh Army)
8th AAA Group (Wiesbaden)
63rd AAA Bn, 90-mm (Wiesbaden)
443d AAA Bn, 75-mm (Wiesbaden)
69th AAA Group (Ettringen)
7th AAA Bn, 75-mm (Mannheim)
552d AAA Bn, 90-mm (Knielingen)

In addition, Seventh Army Artillery included two 40-mm AW battalions, the 62d stationed at Mannheim and the 73d at Knielingen, and each of the five divisions also had an organic 40-mm AW battalion, for a total of 19 antiaircraft artillery battalions.\(^{1}\)

d. **The Nike Conversion.** USAREUR's Nike conversion plan at this time called for six of the seven 90-mm battalions to be converted, beginning in October, in the following order: 63d, 552d, 67th, 45th, 95th, and 25th AAA Battalions. This meant that the Seventh Army battalions protecting the Rhine River bridges would receive first priority, followed by the theater army battalions and alternating between those protecting Rhine River bridges and those in the Kaiserslautern area. (See Map 3.)

In June 1957 USAREUR had already dispatched three officers to form the Army element of the joint air defense staff at Twelfth Air Force headquarters, which was to work out air defense procedures that would be acceptable to both services in Europe. When USEUCOM failed to authorize a formal joint staff, the Army element was redesignated as the USAREUR Air Defense Liaison Group.\(^{1}\)

The actual introduction of Nike began on 9 October 1957 with the conversion of the 63d and 552d AAA Battalions, followed by the 67th and 45th on 1 November, and the 95th and 25th on 5 December.\(^{1}\)

\(^{1}\) (1) USAREUR Anl Hist Rept, FY 1957, pp. 162-63, 178. SECRET.
(2) USAREUR Sta List, 30 Jun 57. CONF.

\(^{1}\) The redesignation occurred between June 1957 and May 1958, when the USAREUR liaison personnel were withdrawn from Twelfth Air Force. (USAREUR Anl Hist Rept, FY 1958, p. 150. SECRET.)

\(^{1}\) (1) USAREUR Anl Hist Rept, FY 1958, pp. 15, 135. SECRET (info used CONF). (2) Seventh Army Anl Hist Rept, FY 1958, pp. 45, 92. SECRET. (3) USAREUR GO's 255, 290, and 314, 1957. UNCLASS. (4) The last 90-mm battalion in Europe, the 40th AAA Battalion, was not converted to Nike and was subsequently inactivated effective 10 April 1958. (USAREUR GO 98, 31 Mar 58. UNCLASS.)
With the conversion completed and the first Nike battalions becoming operationally ready, in January 1958 USAREUR formally changed air defense responsibility. The west bank of the Rhine River was the boundary between the forward area, in which Seventh Army's field forces and facilities were situated, and the rear area, where COMZ static facilities and Air Force installations were located. Seventh Army, with two Nike battalions, two 75-mm Sky-sweeper battalions, and four 40-mm automatic weapons battalions, was responsible for the air defense of the forward zone, giving priority to the protection of nuclear delivery means, major headquarters, and the Rhine River bridges. Seventh Army's air defense was coordinated with appropriate Air Force agencies.

Responsibility for the air defense of the rear area west of the Rhine was assigned to the 32d AAA Brigade, which at the time had four Nike and three Sky-sweeper battalions.

9. (S) Assumption of Operational Control by Air Force Commanders

a. The Army - Air Force Conflict. With the Nike missile system operational in Europe, the question of command and control of air defense resources -- both within the U.S. forces and on the international NATO level -- became even more significant.

Since the USAREUR Air Defense Liaison Group and Twelfth Air Force had been unable to agree on air defense policies, USAREUR unilaterally published its Air Defense Directive Number 1 which, among other things, assigned certain coordination responsibilities to CINCUSAFE -- who naturally objected to an Army directive that attempted to interpret his assigned responsibilities. Instead, he insisted again in March 1958 that an Air Force commander should be responsible for establishing air defense procedures -- a claim that USAREUR, in turn, rejected because USEUCOM had not established a theater-wide air defense command or authority.

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15 Seventh Army's 2 Nike battalions became operational during the last 10 days of January 1958. (Seventh Army Anl Hist Rept, FY 1958, p. 90. SECRET [info used CONF].)

16 (1) USAREUR Anl Hist Rept, FY 1958, p. 150. (2) Seventh Army Anl Hist Rept, FY 1958, p. 92. Both SECRET.

17 USAREUR Anl Hist Rept, FY 1958, p. 151. SECRET.
b. The NATO Plan. Meanwhile, the issue of NATO air defense command and control had again been raised. In December 1957 SACEUR/USCINCER -- General Lauris Norstad, U.S. Air Force -- proposed that NATO air defense capabilities be integrated, rather than merely coordinated, and that operational control of all national air defense forces be vested in NATO commanders in both peace- and wartime. The NATO Standing Group approved the proposal in principle and directed SACEUR to develop and submit an organizational concept and a corresponding command and control system.

In a draft plan distributed in February 1958 SACEUR proposed that the NATO nations assign to him the responsibility, authority, and necessary means to provide air defense for all NATO Europe; this responsibility and authority would have to be unqualified, with no division of control between national and NATO military commands. All air defense aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, and conventional antiaircraft artillery elements should be designated as assigned units and placed under SACEUR's operational command and control. The integrated NATO system would be organized along regional lines -- using existing regional boundaries -- with a NATO air defense commander for each region having operational control over all assigned air defense assets in his region. Actual operational control authority would be delegated through the NATO chain of command and would be exercised by the Allied Tactical Air Force commanders. Logistic support, administration, and discipline of the assigned air defense forces would remain national responsibilities.

USAREUR objected to the proposal on the grounds that, according to AR 525-50, air defense weapons in the field army were to remain under the operational control of the field army commander, subject only to the coordinating procedures established by the theater air defense commander, whose staff should be a joint Army and Air Force organization. Since the implementation of NATO defense plans might be delayed in wartime, any air defense organizational structure should be flexible enough to permit U.S. forces to conduct their own defense, if necessary.

USAREUR proposed a modification of the SACEUR plan that, in effect, would have extended to the international sphere a system roughly parallel to the division of responsibilities that USAREUR had unilaterally established for its own air defense units. As previously mentioned, the NATO commands in central Europe included CENTAG, commanded by CINCUSAREUR in a dual capacity, and FOURATAP, commanded by CINCUSAFFE.13 USAREUR proposed the establishment of an air defense

13 CINCUSAFFE's command of FOURATAP became effective 1 July 1958. (USAFA Hist., 1958, p. 22. SECRET [info used UNCLASS].)
boundary between a forward area, in which field army interests predominated, and a rear area containing static Army and Air Force installations. The boundary would be flexible and subject to CENTAG and FOURATAF coordination to conform to changing situations. Air defense units forward of the boundary would be assigned or attached to the field army and would operate under the operational control of CENTAG in coordination with FOURATAF operating procedures; air defense units to the rear of the boundary would function as elements of an integrated organization under the operational control of FOURATAF.

In the two highest stages of alert (yellow and red) air defense units would be free to engage any aircraft not positively identified as friendly; a "hold fire" could be directed for rear area units, but only requested of the field army commander for the units in the forward area.

In effect, the proposal meant that Seventh Army's organic air defense units would remain under the operational control of the field army commander, and only the four Nike battalions of the 32d Artillery Brigade would come under the operational control of a NATO air defense commander.

In May Allied Air Forces, Central Europe (AIRCENT) -- the NATO headquarters commanding FOURATAF and TWOATAF -- recommended that all Nike battalions be placed under the operational control of the ATAF commanders. SACEUR, however, replied that no delegation of operational control to NATO headquarters would be made until the overall action to establish an integrated NATO air defense was completed and approved.

USAREUR also opposed the AIRCENT recommendation, maintaining that only some of its Nike units could be considered theater air defense forces, while those assigned to Seventh Army properly belonged to the field army commander for the defense of his own forces.

In May it appeared that discussions at the JCS level had resulted in a stalemate over SACEUR's integrated NATO air defense proposals. The Air Force maintained that all Army weapons primarily intended for air defense should be under the operational control of the theater air commander, whereas the Army insisted that air defense weapons organic to the Army forces should not be placed under SACEUR's operational control.

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19The 32d AAA Brigade was redesignated 32d Artillery Brigade (Air Defense) in March 1958. (USAREUR GO 98, 1958. UNCLASS.)

20USAREUR Anl Hist Rept, FY 1958, pp. 146-51. SECRET.
There were indications that the Department of the Army might be willing to yield on Nike units but would insist on retaining the Hawk -- which was programmed for deployment to Europe -- under the control of field army commanders.\(^2\)

c. CINCUSAPE -- The Air Defense Commander. With the issue of NATO command and control thus at least temporarily blocked, in July 1958 USCINCCEUR passed to USAREUR and USAFE a draft of a proposed air defense directive that would assign to CINCUSAPE the air defense mission for the entire U.S. European Command pending the establishment of an integrated NATO air defense organization. All USAREUR surface-to-air missile systems and their tactical command headquarters would be placed under the operational control of CINCUSAPE, who immediately commented that the directive was "clear and concise" and required no expansion.\(^2\)

General H.I. Hodges, who was then CINCUSAPE, did not oppose the assignment of his Nike units to Air Force operational control but insisted that the conventional antiaircraft artillery units remain at the disposal of the field army commander. He further recommended that CINCUSAPE establish rules of engagement that would prescribe "guns free" as the normal status for Nike units in red or yellow alert conditions and that any "hold fire" orders issued to air defense units east of the Rhine should require the concurrence of the field army commander.

These terms would have duplicated the rules of engagement that USAREUR had proposed in the framework of the CENTAG-FOURATAF discussions earlier in the year. CINCUSAPE objected, pointing out that a "guns free" alert status would be tantamount to removing the Nike units from his operational control. On the other hand, the USCINCCEUR draft directive applied only to air defense missile units, and CINCUSAPE considered it neither necessary nor desirable to include other weapons -- such as conventional gun units -- under his operational control, a view that was shared by USCINCCEUR. The latter advised USAREUR early in August that conventional AAA units would not be affected by the proposed directive but that CINCUSAPE could not be restricted in his employment of Army missile units to accomplish his air defense mission.

\(^2\) USAFE Hist, 1958, pp. 206-07. SECRET.

\(^2\) (1) USAFE Hist, 1958, p. 207. (2) The USCINCCEUR message and CINCUSAPE's reply were both dated 22 July 1958. (Ibid). SECRET.
As originally proposed, USEUCOM formally issued the directive on 15 August 1958, placing USAREUR's 32d Artillery Brigade headquarters, together with its six Nike battalions, under the operational control of CINCUSAFE; USAREUR issued appropriate reassignment directives.\(^2\)\(^3\)

To complete the realignment of air defense assets, USAREUR inactivated the 34th AAA Brigade headquarters and three of the 40-mm AW battalions during the second half of 1958. Since the reorganisation under the Pentomic concept had eliminated the organic AW battalions from the divisional TOE, USAREUR divided Seventh Army's remaining four 40-mm and two 75-mm gun battalions evenly between the two corps.\(^2\)\(^4\)

Under these arrangements the Seventh Army commander had no centralized control over air defense weapons in the field army area. The artillery air defense assets were controlled at the corps level through air defense command posts (ADCP) subject to the operational control procedures established by CINCUSAFE or his designated representative as the theater air defense commander. The 32d Brigade and its Nike battalions were similarly under the operational control of the air defense commander although assigned to the command of USAREUR.\(^2\)\(^5\)

The four U.S. Nike battalions, scheduled as second increment, were not deployed to Europe. As early as March 1957 the United States had decided to offer Nike missile systems for sale to NATO countries.

\(^2\)\(^3\)(1) USAFE Hist, 1958, pp. 207-09. SECRET. (2) TS Suppl to USAREUR Anl Hist Rept, FY 1958, pp. 57-58. TS (info used SECRET). (3) From November 1957 to May 1958 USAREUR had gradually streamlined the air defense command structure by inactivating the AAA groups, so that both gun and missile battalions were directly subordinate to the 32d and 34th Artillery Brigades. In anticipation of the USCINCEUR air defense directive, on 26 July 1958 USAREUR had transferred Seventh Army's two Nike battalions from the 34th to the 32d Artillery Brigade so that all the Nike units under USAFE operational control would be under a single command. CONF.

\(^2\)\(^4\)(1) Seventh Army Anl Hist Repts, FY 1958, p. 92; FY 1959, p. 160. SECRET. (2) USAREUR 60's 249, 296, and 324, 1958. UNCLAS.

\(^2\)\(^5\)(1) Seventh Army Anl Hist Rept, FY 1959, pp. 163-64, Chart 3. SECRET. (2) USAREUR Anl Hist, FY 1959, pp. 57-58. TS (info used SECRET).
under the Military Assistance Program (MAP); the French Government
subsequently agreed to purchase two battalion sets of equipment,
and the F.R.G. Government, six.26

Thus, with the phaseout of conventional AAA weapons and the
deployment of Army missile units to Europe, the question of command
and control of air defense units was also resolved. In the U.S.
unilateral command structure, the Air Force component commander had
been given control of air defense assets. Although a parallel NATO
command and control structure was still lacking, the NATO Standing
Group had approved such a concept in principle, and planning was in
progress. Finally, by accepting the U.S. offer to sell them Nike
equipment under MAP, other NATO nations had established the material
basis for the development of an integrated air defense system covering
all of Western Europe.

26USAREUR Anl Hist Repts, FY 1957, p. 176; FY 1958, pp. 145-46;
FY 1959, p. 128; and 1 Jul - 31 Dec 59, p. 25. All info used SECRET.