America’s victory corps!

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On the cover:
“American Troops Advancing” by Harold Brett

The scene is of American doughboys marching into battle in Northern France during World War I, where V Corps was born and fought in the closing months of the “Great War.”

The image is one of many pieces of original art prints and posters in the U.S. Army Center of Military History’s Army artwork collection. For information on ordering CMH products and publications, go to www.army.mil/cmh-pg/catalog/HowTo.htm
Intervar years


World War II


Cold War and Post-Cold War period


V Corps soldiers, veterans, and friends:

V Corps has been serving the nation in peace and war since 1918. Organized overseas, in France, in World War I, the Corps has spent most of its organizational life outside of the United States, either committed to battle in the two World Wars or on the front lines of freedom in times of uneasy peace. Today, V Corps remains in Europe, committed to supporting the NATO alliance and to carrying out the national security objectives of the United States.

The Victory Corps distinguished itself in eight campaigns in two World Wars, earning its nickname during the Meuse-Argonne offensive of World War I and validating its reputation for hard, steady fighting at Omaha Beach in June of 1944. The post-war years have been no less demanding, although in a different way. Veterans of Cold War service in V Corps well recall the exquisite state of training of Corps units and the high tension and watchful readiness of those years.

In the course of the last decade, the demands on V Corps have, if anything, increased, as the Corps has learned to deal with world events that remained somewhere between peace and war, and that ranged all across the spectrum of conflict from peace enforcement through combat operations. Constantly involved in operations of one kind or another since 1990, V Corps has done much of the “heavy lifting” for the United States Army in places as widely separated as the Balkans and east Africa.

This short history of the Corps tells the story of Victory Corps soldiers in the 83 years during which they have invariably met the challenge and won success for the nation. We dedicate this history to those who have served in V Corps, who are serving now in V Corps, and who will serve in V Corps in the future.

Victory Corps!

Dr. Charles E. Kirkpatrick
V Corps Historian
The AEF is formed

The American Expeditionary Force that went to France in 1917 and 1918 was a sketchily trained army built around a core of fewer than 130,000 pre-war regular soldiers. National Guardsmen called to duty had a solid basis of military training, but the bulk of the AEF consisted of volunteers and draftees that had never been in uniform before. The United States Army was as inexperienced institutionally as its soldiers were individually. Many regulars and National Guardsmen had recently served on the Mexican border and in the Punitive Expedition into Mexico in pursuit of Francisco “Pancho” Villa, but those operations rarely involved maneuver of units larger than regiments. More often, they were troop and squadron patrols and raids.

The Army’s other recent combat experience was little more relevant. The Spanish-American War had been brief, and although a Fifth Corps headquarters—a unit that was later disbanded and that had no connection to the V Corps of the Philippine department—was commanded even a brigade in battle was probably not enough to teach the soldiers the tactical lessons that the British and French had assimilated over four years of trench warfare, but also to train them in using weapons with which they had no experience. Among other things, the AEF had to learn about the employment of field and heavy artillery and aerial artillery observation techniques; gas warfare; the use of the tank; and such weapons as trench mortars and heavy machine guns. Furthermore, corps commanders and staffs needed the opportunity to train how to command divisions that numbered around 28,000 men each. By comparison, French and British divisions were about half as large, and German divisions roughly one-third the size of the American division. After the AEF activated corps headquarters, the first task of each corps was to receive and begin the training of divisions that would get their baptism of fire in a final phase of training in the trenches under British or French command. Only after that training was well advanced, and after Pershing activated First Army to command them, would the corps assume a combat rôle.

The nine corps headquarters called for in the General Organization Plan of the AEF were an essential part of Pershing’s scheme to build and train an independent American Army in France. Training specific to the European theater of war was necessary not only to teach the soldiers the tactical lessons that the British and French had assimilated over four years of trench warfare, but also to train them in using weapons with which they had no experience. Among other things, the AEF had to learn about the employment of field and heavy artillery and aerial artillery observation techniques; gas warfare; the use of the tank; and such weapons as trench mortars and heavy machine guns. Furthermore, corps commanders and staffs needed the opportunity to train how to command divisions that numbered around 28,000 men each. By comparison, French and British divisions were about half as large, and German divisions roughly one-third the size of the American division. After the AEF activated corps headquarters, the first task of each corps was to receive and begin the training of divisions that would get their baptism of fire in a final phase of training in the trenches under British or French command. Only after that training was well advanced, and after Pershing activated First Army to command them, would the corps assume a combat rôle.

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Responding to First Army orders, V Corps rushed its 26th Division south through the forests to Vigneulles, where it met troops of the IV Corps’ 1st Division about 0600 on 13 September, closing the salient and cutting off the retreat of the Germans to their west. Minor operations to take control of prisoners throughout the area continued until 16 September, when the American units turned over the line to a French corps and redeployed for the next major offensive.

St. Mihiel offensive

Five weeks after its activation, V Corps moved into battle for the first time. On 19 August, the corps relieved a French corps in the trenches along the western side of the St. Mihiel salient in Lorraine. For almost a month, until 10 September, V Corps troops defended their sector without incident, and with comparatively light casualties. The V Corps sector was on the left, or northern, flank of a salient that was 24 miles wide at its base and that extended thirteen miles into allied lines. The salient had changed little in shape in four years, and combined three lines of excellent field fortifications with natural defensive advantages that the Germans had steadily developed throughout the war. An elaborate system of wire entanglements covered defenses that ranged from six to eight miles in depth, and that the French had unsuccessfully attacked several times. Because Pershing had been interested in the salient almost from the beginning, his attention had been focused on this sector, and he had arranged for many American divisions to be assigned to the trenches along its face for their combat seasoning. Thus, although the American divisions could only be characterized as green, they did have some familiarity with the terrain and the conditions they would eventually face in their first major attack. For the offensive, First Army commanded 550,000 Americans and 110,000 French troops in four corps, in what was the first entirely American-planned and -led operation of the war.

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V Corps

The history of V Corps is marked by its role in shaping the American military's ability to fight in the modern battlefield. From the interwar years through World War II, V Corps was a significant player in the development of the Army's ability to conduct large-scale operations. The corps was established in the 1920s as a response to the Treaty of Versailles and the need to reduce the size of the Army. In the 1930s, it was reorganized to reflect the new strategic realities of a world on the brink of war. By World War II, V Corps was a well-trained and well-equipped force that played a key role in the Allied victory in Europe.

At the start of World War II, V Corps was part of the US Army's Western Command, responsible for defending the US west coast. However, as the war progressed, the corps was called upon to take on increasingly larger roles. In 1943, it was assigned to the Mediterranean Theater of Operations (TWO), where it played a key role in the invasion of Sicily and the subsequent advance into Italy. In 1944, it was one of the first American corps to land on France's beaches during the Normandy invasion, and it played a key role in the advance through the German defenses in the Battle of the Bulge.

After the war, V Corps continued to be a vital part of the Army's planning and training. It was involved in the Korean War, where it played a key role in the defense of South Korea. In the Vietnam War, the corps was again a major player, supporting American forces in the struggle against the communists. Throughout its history, V Corps has been known for its professionalism and its ability to adapt to changing military needs.

The units that have been assigned to V Corps over the years have been a testament to the corps's ability to fight in the modern battlefield. From the 1st Infantry Division to the 101st Airborne Division, V Corps has been home to some of the Army's most elite and experienced units.

In conclusion, V Corps has been a cornerstone of the US Army's military strategy and has played a key role in shaping the modern battlefield. Its history is a testament to the Army's ability to adapt and respond to changing military needs. As the Army looks to the future, V Corps will continue to be a vital part of the US military's strategic planning.

Units Commanded By V Corps

This list includes divisions and regimental maneuver units assigned to V Corps control. During wartime, the corps commanded an average of three to five divisions at any one time. Army and field army orders often shifted divisions among corps, in response to the prevailing tactical situation. The normal Cold War era organization was one armored division, one mechanized infantry division, and one armored cavalry regiment. Changes in V Corps organization at the end of the Cold War resulted from deployments of units to Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm and from reorganization incident to the drawdown of the Army. V Corps has always had a Corps Artillery organization assigned, and has also commanded a wide range of supporting arms and services of regimental, brigade, and smaller-sized units.

World War I, 1918-1919
1st Infantry Division (“The Big Red One”) 2nd Infantry Division (“Indianhead”) 3rd Infantry Division (“Marne Division”) 4th Infantry Division (“Yankee”) 26th Infantry Division (French) 32nd Infantry Division (“Red Arrow”) 33rd Infantry Division 42nd Infantry Division (Rainbow) 77th Infantry Division (St. Mihiel) 79th Infantry Division (Lorraine) 90th Infantry Division (Middle West) 91st Infantry Division (Wild West) 15th (French) Colonial Infantry Division

World War II, 1941-1946
1st Infantry Division (“The Big Red One”) 2nd Infantry Division (“Indianhead”) 3rd Infantry Division (“Marne Division”) 4th Infantry Division (“Ivy Division”) 5th Infantry Division (“Red Diamond”) 8th Infantry Division (“Pathfinder”) 9th Infantry Division (“Old Reliables”) 28th Infantry Division (Keystone) 29th Infantry Division (“Blue and Gray”) 30th Infantry Division (Old Hickory) 35th Infantry Division (Santa Fe) 69th Infantry Division 78th Infantry Division (Lightning) 80th Infantry Division (Blue Ridge) 82nd Airborne Division (“All American”) 90th Infantry Division (Tough ’Ombres) 97th Infantry Division 106th Infantry Division 2nd Armored Division (“Hell on Wheels”) 3rd Armored Division (“Spearhead”) 5th Armored Division (Victory) 7th Armored Division (“Lucky Seventh”) 9th Armored Division (“Remagen”) 16th Armored Division 102nd Cavalry Group (Mechanized) 2nd (French) Armored Division

Fort Bragg, 1946-1951
82nd Airborne Division (“All American”)

Cold War, 1951-1990
1st Infantry Division (“Big Red One”) 3rd Infantry Division (“Spearhead”) 4th Infantry Division (“Ivy Division”) 6th Infantry Division (“Pathfinder”) 10th Infantry Division 2nd Armored Division (“Hell on Wheels”) 3rd Armored Division (“Spearhead”) 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (“The Blackhorse Regiment”) 14th Armored Cavalry Regiment

Post-Cold War, 1990-present
1st Infantry Division (“Big Red One”) 3rd Infantry Division (“Spearhead”) 8th Infantry Division (“Pathfinder”) 1st Armored Division (“Old Ironsides”) 3rd Armored Division (“Spearhead”) 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (“SecondDragoons”) 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (“Blackhorse Regiment”) 5th (German) Panzer Division (in the Bi-National Corps) 13th (German) Panzer Division (in the Bi-National Corps)

In terms of numbers, the results of the St. Mihiel offensive were impressive. American attacks had eliminated a salient of some 200 square miles, captured 16,000 prisoners, and taken 443 cannon, at a cost of 7,000 casualties to the four allied corps involved. More important than the purely military results, was the fact that elimination of the salient restored use of a number of important railroad links that German occupation of the ground had disrupted. In terms of American battle prowess, however, the results were debatable. The Americans and French outnumbered the German defenders of the salient by a factor of 46 to one. Moreover, the Germans were disorganized and in the process of withdrawing when First Army attacked, and the final line the offensive achieved coincided very nearly with the new defensive line the Germans had intended to occupy after withdrawing from the area. Gen. Hunter Liggett, commanding I Corps, remarked that the “effect on the enemy, our own, and allied morale was all that we had hoped for.” He qualified his satisfaction with the results of the battle by adding that “in our pride we should not forget that it had been no even fight.” As V Corps marched to its assembly areas for the forthcoming offensive in the Argonne, however, it took with it soldiers who had a successful battle behind them and who had learned the techniques of breaking through elaborately protected trench systems.

Meuse-Argonne offensive

Following the St. Mihiel operation, V Corps moved a short distance to the northwest —the Meuse-Argonne sector—and took up positions near Verdun—Meuse. While the St. Mihiel offensive was an American operation, the Meuse-Argonne attack in which V Corps was about to participate was a general offensive involving both the American and French armies and planned by Marshal Ferdinand Foch, the allied supreme commander. The intention was to push the Germans as far back toward the Rhine River as possible, depleting the German reserves and preparing for the final offensive that Foch considered
necessary in the spring of 1919. The First Army’s mission was to attack northward between the Argonne Forest and the Meuse River in the direction of Sedan. Foch expected that, even if the Americans did not advance as far as the plan called for, their attack would force the Germans to withdraw from other portions of the front to reinforce the Argonne sector. The American attack was also directed against the German lines of communication, and aimed at cutting the two important railways that ran northward from the area around Metz and paralleled the front. Because the Germans used the railroads to move troops laterally along the front and to supply their divisions, Foch believed that cutting the rail lines would inevitably force the German army to withdraw, perhaps as far back as the Rhine.

Appreciating the importance of the area, the German high command laid careful defensive plans that exploited the difficult terrain of the Argonne Forest, where numerous east-west ridges provided strong, natural defensive positions. The Germans organized their defenses into four lines. In their sector, the Americans outnumbered the Germans by about six to one, but the German army had up to 15 full-strength divisions ready to plan, V Corps encountered difficulties almost immediately. The corps only had a single road leading to the front to handle all the troop movements and traffic of artillery and support units, a factor that complicated operations. Hitting heavy resistance, the inexperienced divisions could not reach Montfaucon, and that failure retarded the whole First Army plan. The corps finally took its first-day objectives on day three of the attack, primarily as a result of the brilliant fighting of the 91st Division, but the slow pace of the advance gave the Germans time to bring reinforcements up to the front, with six infantry divisions arriving by 28 September to bolster the defenses. Although an unfortunate development for First Army, that fulfilled part of Foch’s objective on day three of the attack, the inexperienced divisions provided strong, natural defensive positions.

While the attack began well, and the two adjacent corps advanced according to plan, V Corps encountered difficulties almost immediately. The corps only had a single road leading to the front to handle all the troop movements and traffic of artillery and support units, a factor that complicated operations. Hitting heavy resistance, the inexperienced divisions could not reach Montfaucon, and that failure retarded the whole First Army plan. The corps finally took its first-day objectives on day three of the attack, primarily as a result of the brilliant fighting of the 91st Division, but the slow pace of the advance gave the Germans time to bring reinforcements up to the front, with six infantry divisions arriving by 28 September to bolster the defenses. Although an unfortunate development for First Army, that fulfilled part of Foch’s objective on day three of the attack, the inexperienced divisions provided strong, natural defensive positions.

V Corps was to capture it. First Army would then use the heights at Montfaucon as an artillery position to support the second day’s attack through the Hindenburg Line to seize Cunel and Romagne, both towns in the V Corps sector.

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The position of deputy commanding general was first authorized under Table of Organization and Equipment 52-2H (28 September 1974), but V Corps did not organize under that TOE until 21 May 1977. Until that time it was under TOE 52-1H.

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Command Roster

V CORPS COMMANDERS

World War I

Maj. Gen. William M. Wright
12 July 1918 to 20 August 1918
Maj. Gen. George H. Cameron
21 August 1918 to 11 October 1919
Maj. Gen. Charles P. Summerall
12 October 1918 to 2 May 1919

Reactivation and World War II

Maj. Gen. Campbell B. Hodges
20 October 1940 to 16 March 1941
Maj. Gen. Edmund L. Daley
17 March 1941 to 19 January 1942
Maj. Gen. William S. Key
10 January 1942 to 19 May 1942
Maj. Gen. Russell P. Hartle
20 May 1942 to 14 July 1943
15 July 1943 to 17 September 1944
18 September 1944 to 4 October 1944
5 October 1944 to 14 January 1945
Maj. Gen. Clarence R. Huebner
15 January 1945 to 11 November 1945

Cold War era

Maj. Gen. Frank W. Milburn
12 November 1945 to 6 June 1946
Maj. Gen. Orlando Ward
7 June 1946 to 15 November 1946
Maj. Gen. S. LeRoy Irwin
16 November 1946 to 31 October 1948

Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge
1 November 1948 to 31 August 1950
Lt. Gen. John W. Leonard
1 September 1950 to 18 June 1951
Brig. Gen. Boniface Campbell
19 June 1951 to 1 August 1951
Maj. Gen. John E. Dahlquist
2 August 1951 to 4 March 1953
Maj. Gen. Ira P. Swift
5 March 1953 to 17 June 1954
Lt. Gen. Charles E. Hart
18 June 1954 to 28 March 1956
Lt. Gen. Lennel Mathewson
29 March 1956 to 16 August 1957
Lt. Gen. F. W. Farrell
17 August 1957 to 31 March 1959
Lt. Gen. Paul D. Adams
1 April 1959 to 30 September 1960
Lt. Gen. Frederick J. Brown
1 October 1960 to 28 August 1961
Lt. Gen. John K. Waters
29 August 1961 to 14 May 1962
Lt. Gen. J. H. Michaelis
15 May 1962 to 14 July 1963
Lt. Gen. John H. Polk
15 July 1963 to 3 August 1964
Lt. Gen. James H. Polk
1 September 1964 to 27 February 1966
Lt. Gen. George R. Madier
28 February 1966 to 31 May 1967
Lt. Gen. Andrew J. Boyle
1 June 1967 to 31 July 1969
Lt. Gen. C. E. Hutchins, Jr.
15 September 1969 to 23 January 1971
Lt. Gen. Willard Pearson
14 February 1971 to 11 May 1973
Lt. Gen. William R. Desory
1 June 1973 to 24 August 1975
Lt. Gen. Robert L. Fair
25 August 1975 to 4 January 1976
Lt. Gen. Donn A. Starry
16 February 1976 to 17 June 1977
Lt. Gen. Sidney B. Berry
19 July 1977 to 27 February 1980
27 February 1980 to 15 July 1981
15 July 1981 to 25 September 1984
Lt. Gen. Robert L. Weitzel
29 May 1984 to 21 June 1986
Lt. Gen. Colin L. Powell
23 June 1986 to 1 January 1987
Maj. Gen. Lincoln Jones III
1 January 1987 to 23 March 1987
23 March 1987 to 21 July 1989
Lt. Gen. George A. Joulwan
7 August 1989 to 8 November 1990

Post-Cold War era

Lt. Gen. David M. Maddox
9 November 1990 to 17 June 1992
Lt. Gen. Jerry R. Rutherford
17 June 1992 to 4 April 1993
Lt. Gen. John N. Abrams
6 April 1993 to 31 July 1997
Lt. Gen. John W. Hendrix
31 July 1997 to 6 June 1999
Lt. Gen. James C. Riley
16 November 1999 – 18 July 2001
Lt. Gen. William S. Wallace
18 July 2001 to October. At that point, Pershing replaced Cameron with Maj. Gen. Charles P. Summerall as corps commander and reshuffled divisions, giving V Corps the experienced 42nd and 32nd Divisions, with the 89th Division as a reserve. Summerall was the right choice to command the corps at a difficult moment. An artillery officer with a considerable reputation for innovation and aggressive-ness, Summerall had previously commanded the 1st Field Artillery Brigade of the 1st Infantry Division in the first American attack of the war at Cantigny, in the summer of 1918, and then had commanded the 1st Infantry Division. Disdauntful of enemy fire himself, he expected similar behavior of his com-manders and staff and was quick to relieve any officer he saw as incompetent, hesitant or shy under fire. Summerall had developed infantry-artillery coordination to a fine art, within the limitations of the communications available in 1918, and had already demonstrated that he was one of the most brilliant tactical command-ers in the AEF. When he took command, Summerall promptly reorga-nized the artillery support corps provided the infantry divisions, and the next attack on 21 October overran the German defenses around Canal and broke the third German defensive line, the Kriemhilde Stellung. First Army was at that point poised to attack the final German line.

The final phase of the offensive began on 1 November. V Corps launched the 89th Division and the seasoned 1st and 2nd Divisions toward the Freya Stellung, the final German defenses before Sedan, and broke through by noon. The German army began a general withdrawal with the Americans in close pursuit. On the night of 6 to 7 November, 1st Division of V Corps captured the heights in front of Sedan, opening the way for the XVII French Corps to capture the city. During the morning of 8 November, the corps began crossing the Meuse River and continued to advance until the cessation of hostilities on 11 November.

End of the war and return to the United States

Throughout the war, V Corps operated under close control of First Army and suffered its due proportion of that Army’s 117,000 casualties. Some allied observers commented that Americans took undue losses because they did not properly learn their tactical lessons from the British and French. Criticism notwithstanding, the corps emerged from World War I with the appellation “Victory Corps,” in recognition of its hard fighting and the rapid advances it made during the last phase of the Meuse-Argonne offensive. In the years between the two World Wars, professional soldiers carefully studied the problems American forces encountered in 1918, however, and one result of the AEF experience was that a small, but influential number of leaders laid the groundwork for the mechanized and armored style of war that the U.S. Army waged between 1942 and 1945. Officers assigned to V Corps had some personal experience that helped them to understand later developments in the mechanization of military forces. In both the St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne offensives, V Corps attacks were sup-ported by American armored battalions commanded by then-Col. George S. Patton. Summerall’s practice of sending howitzers forward to support the assault troops presaged the development of motorized artillery to accompany the infantry. Especially in the Meuse-Argonne offensive, V Corps leaders learned something about developing plans that included tactical air support from the new Air Service. Finally, mobile antiaircraft artillery, a new arm of service developed in 1918, accompanied V Corps units and protected river crossings, artillery, supply depots, and headquarters from German attack.

A monument honoring V Corps soldiers who fought and died in France during World War I was erected near Mouzon, France in November 1918. The monument, later damaged by fighting in World War II, was rebuilt and rededicated in 2001.
reached the temporary rank of lieutenant on the staff of the AEF. Despite having during World War I. Instead, he served the opportunity to command in battle six years Huebner's senior, did not have commissioned in 1917. Leonard T. Gerow, outranked all of his contemporaries wounded in action. A temporary lieutenant-Medal for leadership. He was twice for valor and the Distinguished Service with two Distinguished Service Crosses every major action and was decorated the end of the war, Huebner fought in At the front from November 1917 through Infantry from platoon through regiment. At the front from November 1917 through the end of the war. Huebner fought in every major action and was decorated with two Distinguished Service Crosses for valor and the Distinguished Service Medal for leadership. He was twice wounded in action. A temporary lieutenant-colonel at the end of the war, Huebner outranked all of his contemporaries commissioned in 1917. Leonard T. Gerow, six years Huebner’s senior, did not have the opportunity to command in battle during World War I. Instead, he served on the staff of the AEF. Despite having no opportunity for distinction, he also reached the temporary rank of lieutenant colonel. Later becoming one of the Army’s foremost staff officers, Gerow became chief of the War Plans Division of the War Department General Staff immediately before the Second World War. During World War II, those two officers commanded V Corps. Many other officers who later commanded divisions under V Corps control in World War II had their first taste of battle in World War I as well. John Leonard, who commanded the 9th Armored Division, was an infantryman who had marched into Mexico with the 6th Infantry in the Punitive Expedition of 1916 and who commanded the 3rd Battalion of that regiment in the St. Miheul and Meuse-Argonne battles, earning a Distinguished Service Cross and being wounded in action. Edward Brooks, who commanded the 2nd Armored Division, served in the 76th Field Artillery in World War I and was also decorated with the Distinguished Service Cross. Louis Craig commanded 9th Infantry Division. In World War I, he served both in the line and on division, corps, and army staffs, took part in four campaigns and earned foreign awards that included the British Distinguished Service Order, the French Chevalier of the Legion of Honor and Croix de Guerre with Palm, and the Belgian Order of the Crown of Leopold and Croix de Guerre. Charles Helmick took part in four campaigns and earned foreign awards that included the British Distinguished Service Order, the French Chevalier of the Legion of Honor and Croix de Guerre with Palm, and the Belgian Order of the Crown of Leopold and Croix de Guerre. Charles Helmick commanded V Corps Artillery in World War II, including the decisive action at the Battle of the Bulge, where Corps Artillery orchestrated the fires of 37 field artillery battalions at Eibenborn Ridge. In World War I, he commanded Battery B, 15th Field Artillery, was later regimental executive officer, fought on the Marne and at Soissons, and won two Silver Stars. Paul Baade commanded the 35th Infantry Division in World War II. In the First World War, he was a company commander in the 332nd Infantry of the 81st Infantry Division in the last months of the war. Charles Gerhardt commanded 29th Infantry Division during the assault on Normandy in World War II. He went to France in 1918 with the 3rd Cavalry Regiment, and was at the front as aide-de-camp to Maj. Gen. William M. Wright in V Corps, VII Corps, and in the 89th Infantry Division. Robert Hasbrouck, who commanded 7th Armored Division, went to France in 1918 with the 62nd Coast Artillery. Leland Hobbs, who commanded the workhorse, and very successful, 30th Infantry Division, arrived in France in 1918 with the 11th Infantry Division just in time for the armistice.

V Corps remained in Europe from the armistice through March 1919, responsible for training the divisions that were to serve in the American Third Army, assigned to occupation duty in the Rhineland. In March, the corps stood down, as the Army inactivated all its corps headquarters, and on 2 May, V Corps was demobilized at Camp Funston, Kansas. Two years later, on 29 July 1921, V Corps was among the headquarters reconstituted as inactive units in the Army Reserve. The corps was briefly active at Fort Thomas, Kentucky, from 17 February 1922 through 15 November 1924, and then remained in the active reserves. On 1 October 1933, the War Department allotted V Corps to the Regular Army, although the headquarters remained on the inactive list in the tiny interwar service.
In 2001, V Corps found itself with a completely new set of missions, far removed from the mission it accomplished during the Cold War. Emphasizing the kind of agility and flexibility that characterized Gen. Crosbie Saint’s 1989 vision of the “capable corps,” V Corps remained poised to respond to crises anywhere in the hemisphere. The planning for regional operations throughout the EUCOM area of responsibility prompted the corps to adopt an additional and informal motto that V Corps was “an ocean closer” in case of emergency.

As 2001 drew to a close, V Corps was sobered by the events of September 11, when terrorists attacked the World Trade Towers in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., causing great destruction and loss of life. As a consequence, the corps, along with the rest of the Army in Europe, enacted a series of stringent security measures to protect its soldiers, families, and installations and prepared itself to carry out its part in the war on terrorism that had just begun. Having taken all of those precautions, however, V Corps proceeded with its normal regimen of exercises and other military activities to maintain its proficiency for combat anywhere in the region and at any point along the spectrum of conflict.

Thus, the 83rd anniversary of its activation found the Victory Corps still in Europe, where it was created in 1918. After two World Wars, decades of Cold War and threat of another world war, the first hectic decade of what some called peace, and the opening of an entirely different sort of war against international terrorism, the corps remained where it has spent the greatest part of its organizational life, “an ocean closer” to potential trouble and prepared to do what is required of it. In 2001, as in 1918 and all the intervening years, the Victory Corps remained ready to fulfill its motto...

**It Will Be Done!**

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### Reactivation of V Corps

V Corps reentered the active rolls of the Army because of the growing threat of war. During the two years between the German invasion of Poland in September 1939 and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the Army conducted a partial mobilization to prepare itself for the war many feared would eventually involve the United States. By the summer of 1940, the German army’s rapid conquest of France and the German Luftwaffe’s aerial assault on the United Kingdom heightened concerns about American preparedness. Congressional reluctance to institute a peacetime draft was overcome in August when the summer encampments of the National Guard revealed many deficiencies in what was theoretically a combat-ready force.

As the Army gradually expanded through the working of the newly enacted Selective Service law and through bringing the National Guard under federal command, additional headquarters became necessary to train the growing number of troops. When he became chief of staff of General Headquarters of the Army, Lt. Gen. Lesley J. McNair immediately recommended, and then supervised, the activation of additional field armies and corps to train the draftees and National Guardsmen inducted into federal service. Thus, War Department general orders activated V Corps at Camp Beauregard, near Alexandria, Louisiana, on 20 October 1940, and assigned it to Third U.S. Army, then under command of Lt. Gen. Walter Knueger.

### The Louisiana Maneuvers

Throughout the winter and spring of
advance to seize crossings over the Red River and then turned to march further north as Krueger modified his plan to allow for Second Army’s deployments. In Phase II (21 to 29 September), the corps confronted Second Army’s VII Corps while the 2nd Armored, 2nd Infantry, and 1st Cavalry Divisions enveloped the left flank of Second Army, establishing the reputations both of the 2nd Armored Division and of its commander, George S. Patton. A plodding infantry organization when compared to the few, and highly publicized, new mechanized and armored units, V Corps had no such moments of distinction, but the maneuvers were nonetheless important to the corps, both as tests of its capabilities and as training for its leaders and soldiers. Unfortunately, many of those benefits were short-lived. Before long, Marshall decided to replace both senior commanders—some 31 generals in the two armies—and many overranged company and field grade officers, particularly in the National Guard divisions, with younger men. Nor did the divisions themselves benefit from the increased proficiency the maneuvers produced, because they were later enhancement module designed to provide mobile command and control for task force or battalion tactical command post. The corps planned a process by which the brigades of the 1st Armored and 1st Infantry Divisions could establish an orderly rotation of the IRF mission and instituted a series of emergency deployment readiness exercises in conjunction with SETAF to test and hone the deployment concept. The first test came in June 2000, when Meigs directed an evaluation of the IRF Soldiers from the Southern European Task Force’s 173rd Airborne Brigade and 1st Armored Division deployed as an IRF in C-130s and UH-60s to Hungary as part of Exercise Lariat Response. Two months later, USAREUR deployed elements of 1st Infantry Division’s 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry, and 1st Military Police Company when it sent the Medium Ready Company to Camp Bondsteel, Kosovo, to augment Task Force Falcon units involved in the peacekeeping operation there. The company remained in Kosovo just over a month before returning to Germany.
could consider cooperation across division boundaries and the other issues involved with tank units. At a more fundamental level, however, Urgent Victory ’01 offered a scenario more attuned the kind of situation that V Corps could actually encounter. It called for a movement to contact exercise with all units in motion as the exercise started, and developed into a meeting engagement in which units had far less precise intelligence about the enemy forces than was characteristic for the WFX. Given the experiences with corps units and other elements of the U.S. armed forces had undergone in Balkans operations, Riley believed that less information about the enemy was more realistic. Innovative in many ways, Exercise Urgent Victory ’01 was a success for V Corps. The exercise provided many opportunities for leaders to try out tactical ideas and develop the situation within their understanding of the commander’s intent, thereby beginning the process of linking leader development with the corps exercise program. At the same time, both divisions were well exercised and practiced in a tactical sense, so that the basic BCTP objective was accomplished as well. After the BCTP, the corps began working to implement the same exercise philosophy at every echelon of command, and to extend the same kinds of leadership development opportunities throughout the chain of command.

The Immediate Ready Force

The development of USAEUR’s Immediate Ready Force was closely conceptually linked to the development of the corps Strike CP—both represented small, agile, rapidly and easily deployable elements that the commander-in-chief could use in a crisis. In 1994, the corps staff began devoting some thought to how heavy armed forces could be quickly deployed outside of Germany if the need arose. The initial concept was to create an alert roster for a heavy company that would use a set of equipment packaged in pre-configured air loads for a heavy company-team mission. Work on the idea was interrupted in 1995 and

1996 when V Corps turned its entire attention to the ongoing NATO mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but both the corps and USAEUR resumed work after Task Force Hawk returned from Albania in the spring of 1999.

When Meigs returned to Heidelberg from his position as COMSFOR in October 1999, he reviewed the concept and incorporated the V Corps concept of the Immediate Ready Company into the evolving USAEUR plan. Meigs based his concept on equipment that could be deployed quickly by the C-130 aircraft daily available in theater, which meant in effect that the force had to be mounted in M-113 Armored Personnel Carriers and HMWWVs. The highest alert force was SETAF’s 173rd Airborne Brigade, which could deploy its 1st Battalion, 508th Airborne Infantry task force, including a field artillery battery and an air defense battery, within twelve hours. The heavy force from Central Region was intended to link up with the theater strategic reserve on order to give USAEUR a quick strike capability.

Within V Corps, the Medium Ready Company was the most ready force. Force Enhancement Modules were created to follow the MRC, including a Heavy Ready Company with armor, engineers for reconnaissance, mobility, and route clearance; military police for security; scouts for reconnaissance or security; combat service support; and a tactical command and control force. The Medium Ready Company was designed to provide the cadres for a rapidly expanding wartime Army. Instead, the point of the General Headquarters Maneuvers was that they set the pattern for operations that the corps would follow throughout World War II: maneuver with infantry-artillery teams supported by independent tank battalions. The other important aspect of the maneuvers was that they allowed the Army to begin to come to grips with those technical aspects of modern warfare that had appeared, but that had really not been developed, during World War I or the succeeding peacetime years: the use of armored forces, the tactical use of air forces, and the organization of antitank units. When the maneuvers ended, the corps returned to Camp Beauregard, where it was still involved with training divisions at the time of Pearl Harbor.

Deployment to the European theater

Immediately upon declaration of war in December 1941, the War Department selected V Corps to become the headquarters dubbed magnet force, and ordered it to Northern Ireland with the two-fold mission of receiving American units as they were sent to the United Kingdom and helping the British prepare for defense against invasion. Advance elements of the corps headquarters left the United States on 10 January 1942 and established a command post in Belfast on 23 January. By 3 March, the first troop units began arriving as the 34th Infantry Division and the 107th Engineer Battalion debarked. Daly was retired from the Army at the same time the movement orders were issued, and Maj. Gen. William S. Key took command briefly during the period of overseas movement. Maj. Gen. Russell P. Hartle assumed command in Ireland on 20 May 1942. It soon became clear that there was no longer any serious threat of a German invasion of the British Isles, and the corps concentrated on receiving and training troops. Besides the 34th Infantry Division, V Corps supervised training of the 1st Armored Division, which arrived in Ireland in June, 1942. The corps began a testing ground for the development of less conventional forces as well. Impressed with the capabilities of the British commando units and seeing a need for similar forces, the War Department authorized Maj. William O. Darby to organize the 1st Ranger Battalion from V Corps volunteers. In November, 1942, when II Corps left England to take part in the North African campaign, the 1st Armored and 34th Infantry Divisions went with it. V Corps remained behind as the senior U.S. Army tactical formation in the United Kingdom and moved its headquarters from Brownlow House, Lurgan, in Northern Ireland, to Clifton College near Bristol, England.

Once in England, the corps continued to receive and train units for eventual combat in Europe, including the 29th Infantry Division from the United States and the 5th Infantry Division, which arrived from a brief tour of duty in Iceland. On 15 July 1943, Maj. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow assumed command of the corps and moved the headquarters to Norton Manor Camp near Taunton in Somerset, where the corps became part of 1st U.S. Army. Stated to take part in the eventual landings in France that were the keystone of American strategy for the war, V Corps was also a part of the operational planning process for the assault. Starting in June, 1943, the corps carried out Operation Wadhams, a deception that involved planning and training for early landings on the Brest peninsula in France. The purpose of Wadhams, which was part of a larger diversionary plan, was to pin down German divisions in France by throwing them off balance before the end of 1943. Various parts of Wadhams eventually became part of the overlord plan for the Normandy invasion. Through it, the Allies learned something about how many divisions could be mounted through the British coastal ports.
A more sophisticated exercise design

As the corps and its major subordinate commands accumulated experience with deployments, proficiency with a wider range of missions also developed as successive corps commanders required a concomitant increase in operational sophistication. The evolution of the mission rehearsal exercise was an important step in that process. Another came in 2001, when Riley linked exercises with leader development. In February of that year, he convened a seminar with his senior commanders and staff to discuss the attributes of the ideal leader in the modern operational environment and to find ways to adjust the conditions within V Corps to foster development of those attributes wherever necessary. A key point was that much would be demanded of leaders at all levels if they were to operate effectively and efficiently on the many types of battlefields the corps could expect, at any point in the wide range of missions from peace enforcement or humanitarian relief to heavy force combat, and in difficult operational environments, particularly in the third world. From the discussions emerged a consensus that leaders had to be adaptable, innovative, aggressive, willing to act in the absence of orders, and willing to take calculated risks on the battlefield; that such leadership should be rewarded; and that some adjustments to the way the corps did business needed to be made to foster the growth of that kind of leadership.

The first major aspect of corps operations to be so adjusted was the exercise program. Riley took the point of view that the kind of leadership necessary in the post-Cold War world had to be developed at home station according to a sophistication. The evolution of the exercise design was predictable and scripted and could not be flexible if their training was inflexible.

As a first step, he applied that truism to the major divisional training event, the Battle Command Training Program Warfighter Exercise, or WFX. The WFX scheduled for 2001 was to be given to 1st Armored Division and was based on the familiar heavy force operational scenario. From the point of view of developing the kind of leadership that Riley sought, the BCTP had shortcomings, since the exercise was predictable and scripted and presented few opportunities for leaders at any level to be innovative. Working with Gen. (Ret.) Fred Franks, who was one of the BCTP senior mentors, and with Lt. Gen. W. M. Steele, commanding the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Riley developed a different and more challenging scenario for the exercise and then obtained approval from Meigs, commander of USAREUR and Seventh Army, and the Chief of Staff of the Army, to implement that scenario.

The first major difference that distinguished Exercise Urgent Victory ’01 from prior Warfighter exercises was that it involved both of the V Corps divisions.

As the exercise began, 1st Infantry Division and 1st Armored Division were separated by 3rd Infantry Division, which was represented by a response cell manned by members of the V Corps staff. Later in the exercise, the two divisions operated side by side, so that the corps...
2000 when the corps held its first Victory Strike exercise. The mission in Albania had revealed areas in which attack aviation operations could be improved, and Gen. Montgomery C. Meigs in February 2000 sent the Chief of Staff of the Army an Aviation White Paper in which he detailed ways to make USAREUR Army aviation “the premier aviation force for the U.S. Army over the next two years.”

Riley assumed responsibility for a more stringent form of aviation exercise as one of the major corps actions in support of that initiative. Riley believed that attack aviation battalions needed to have a Capstone training event that was similar to the National Training Center rotations through which maneuver battalions had been going since 1983. To provide for aviation battalions the same rigor, realism of the battlefield, and high fidelity feedback that combat training centers gave maneuver battalions, he directed the corps staff, working with USAREUR, to devise the exercise that became Victory Strike.

Conducted at the Drawsko Pomorskie training area in Poland, Victory Strike exercised all of those elements of deploying and employing a deep strike task force that previous corps missions shown were critical components of a successful operation. Deployment, both by various ground means and by tactical airlift, was a key part of an exercise that involved live-fire by attack helicopters, the employment of Multiple Launch Rocket Systems, and maneuvering with Poland’s 23rd Brigade of Artillery to fire joint suppression of air defense missions, and the use of 69th Air Defense Artillery Brigade units to simulate an opposing enemy air defense force. In addition, the exercise established ties with the Polish armed forces, which also took part, and exercised the deployment and employment of a much smaller and more mobile corps command post and deep operations coordination cell.

Exercise Victory Strike II in 2001 built upon the successes of the first exercise and was much more joint in nature. The exercise was expanded to include Poland’s Wedrycz Training Area, and added Polish units such as the 23rd Brigade of Artillery to the opposing force headed by 69th ADA. Exercise play was closely monitored by a vast array of sophisticated new battlefield tracking systems expected to be the keystone in making Riley’s vision of providing NTC-type training for aviation and maneuver units available in the European theater, using a deployable training package to provide real-time recording of exercise events and near-immediate feedback for commanders. It also built upon preparatory exercises in Germany by further validating the Strike CP concept, putting the CP to its first real field test.

On June 6, 1944, V Corps entered battle in France. Before World War II ended 11 months and three days later, the corps saw 338 days of continuous combat and advanced roughly 1,300 miles from Normandy to Czechoslovakia in the course of five hard-fought campaigns.

The Normandy landings and the fight for northern France

At 0415 on the morning of June 6, V Corps troops sat in landing craft that lay 10 miles off the Normandy beaches, awaiting the dawn. At 0630, local time, “Force O” soldiers from the 1st and 29th Infantry Divisions under command of Maj. Gen. Clarence R. Huebner, commander of the Big Red One, began wading through the surf on a beach code-named Omaha. It was a hard fight from the very beginning. Expecting to find only a single German regiment defending the beach, the assault troops were instead confronted by major elements of the 352nd Infantry Division that had come through the preliminary aerial and naval gunfire bombardment with little damage to its prepared defenses on the bluffs above the shore. Heavy seas and bad weather complicated landings for the 34,142 soldiers and 3,306 vehicles of the initial assault wave. Almost three-fourths of the assault vehicles and artillery were lost when landing craft capsized or foundered, and nearly all of the amphibious (Duplex Drive) M4 Sherman tanks launched 6,000 yards out failed to reach the shore. Those tanks that Army and Navy commanders on the spot decided to land directly on the beach, rather than launching at sea, suffered heavy losses in
the opening minutes of the assault. Soldiers struggled through heavy surf and then across 200 to 300 yards of open, mined beach, and then found themselves pinned down behind a seawall or, further down the beach, a line of dunes, by unexpectedly heavy fire. Eventually, they also discovered that virtually every unit had landed in the wrong place, and that their carefully prepared assault plans, thoroughly rehearsed against terrain models in England, were worthless.

When “Force B,” under Maj. Gen. Charles H. Gerhard, commander of the 29th Infantry Division, began landing its 25,117 men of the follow-on waves, most Infantry Division and the corps commander. At first impression, the situation was a disaster, with the assault evidently having taken heavy casualties among officers and non-commissioned officers. Desperate for information, Gerow, then aboard the command ship U.S.S. Ancon, dispatched his Assistant Chief of Staff, Col. Benjamin B. Talley, to find out what was happening on the beach. Talley embarked on an amphibious truck, a DUKW, and with a detachment of troops spent several hours cruising back and forth some 500 yards off Omaha beach, ultimately landing there to serve as a liaison officer between elements of the 1st Infantry Division and the corps commander. At that point, the situation was a disaster, with the assault evidently stopped and follow-on boats milling about offshore. Talley, later decorated with a Distinguished Service Cross for his actions on D-Day, was eventually able to report to an anxious Gerow and Huebner that the corps attack was making its way inland, but not before several anxious hours had passed.

Omaha turned out to be the most tenaciously defended of the invasion beaches, and the site of the bloodiest fighting. Around noon, Lt. Gen. Omar Bradley, First Army commander, feared that the landings on Omaha had failed and seriously considered evacuating the beach. By the time that decision had to be made, however, the movement off the beach that Talley had observed had finally begun to retrieve the current battle. There were many variations on the detailed operation of those command posts to suit the style of command of various corps commanders, but the overall structure remained more or less unchanged until 1992, when V Corps began considering ways to move its forces to a battle somewhere other than along the inter-German border.

The first steps in that direction in 1992 and 1993 involved designing a very small, mobile command post on several trucks that the corps commander could use on the battlefield when he was in transit between corps command posts or visiting one of the divisions, and that could also be used as the basis around which a command post deployed outside of Germany could be built. That led directly to a new design for a deployable command post that the corps called the “Tac-Plus,” and which was based upon the tactical command post, augmented in subsequent air missions by other capabilities needed to sustain command of deployed forces in the opening phases of a campaign. When the corps moved its command post to Albania for Operation Victory Hawk, the vans, trailers, and other truck-mounted equipment required an inordinate amount of heavy, strategic airlift.

Force Hawk units were returned to Germany and the Marine 26th MEU was likewise released. The 1st Infantry Division and 1st Armored Division shared the Task Force Falcon mission on 179-day rotations until 1 June 2001, when the XVIII Airborne Corps assigned units to Kosovo. With that transfer of authority, V Corps operations in Kosovo ceased for the time being, although USAREUR directed the corps to monitor and assist in subsequent transfers of authority between units assigned to Task Force Falcon.

The assault command post

The composition and operation of corps command posts was a matter of deep interest for all corps commanders. In the Cold War era, the corps maintained a structure of a rear command post that co-located with the Corps Support Command, a main command post where planning for future operations and support of current operations went on, and a tactical command post that ran the current battle. There were many variations on the detailed operation of those command posts to suit the style of command of various corps commanders, but the overall structure remained more or less unchanged until 1992, when V Corps began considering ways to move its forces to a battle somewhere other than along the inter-German border.

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Reasoning that the corps could not rely on getting priority on strategic airlift, and that a command post that could be moved by the C-130 tactical airlift aircraft available in Europe would be more useful to the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. European Command, began an intensive effort to make the command post smaller, lighter, more mobile, and more quickly deployable.

The resulting “Victory Vanguard” command post, designed in 2000 and tested in the Victory Strike exercise in Poland along with the deep operations coordination cell, was the first step in a process of design and testing that led up to the “Strike CP” that the corps exercised in Exercise Victory Strike II and demonstrated to the Secretary of the Army in September 2001.

The goal that the corps commander, Lt. Gen. James C. Riley, expressed, was for the Strike CP to be quickly deployable with a small number of C-130 air missions. The specific design of the command post was understood to vary depending on the mission of the force it was to command, and the goal was to give the commander-in-chief a good command and control capability in the very early phase of a deterrence or defense mission. Throughout 2001, the corps worked at making the Strike CP more strategically deployable and, at the same time, figuring out how to make it tactically mobile once in a theater of operations.

Meanwhile, the corps retained the capability to go to the field with the full command post structure of tactical, main, and rear in the event of a heavy force operation of a conventional nature. Doing both allowed V Corps to plan realistically to command forces in operations at any point on the spectrum of conflict with a command post appropriately co-located to the troops employed and the mission to be accomplished.

Exercise Victory Strike

The earlier work that V Corps had done in developing the mission rehearsal exercise was further elaborated upon in
Squadrons, 6th Cavalry, from the 11th Aviation Brigade; a general aviation organization based around Battalion, 158th Aviation, from the 12th Aviation Brigade; the 1st Battalion, 27th Field Artillery (MLRS); the 7th Corps Support Group and ground forces of the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division. The 2nd BCT organization included the 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry, 6th Infantry (Mechanized) with an attached tank company and supporting artillery, air defense, signal, and other service forces, and the 2nd Battalion, 50th Armored Infantry, attached from the 2nd Armored Division. The 2/505th brought with it a towed howitzer battery. In addition, task force headquarters troops, controlled by the corps Special Troops Battalion, commanded elements of many of the corps separate brigades.

The lead elements of Task Force Hawk arrived in Albania on 8 April 1999 and forces continued to build up, the last units arriving 29 days later. Shortly after arrival at Tirana-Rinas airport, a small and highly congested field that was already being used by a variety of civilian and military organizations from many nations to provide humanitarian relief to Albanian Kosovars crossing the border into Albania, heavy rains began that swiftly reduced the land around the airfield to a quagmire. Major engineering work had to be contracted before the Apache helicopter task force and general aviation task force, then waiting in Italy for permission to cross the Adriatic, would have any place to land or any firm dispersal areas. The helicopters arrived on 21 April and established a minimum capable force within 48 hours. None of the initial operations the next day. By 26 April, 18 days after the mission started, Task Force Hawk had an operational force that included AH-64 Apache attack helicopters.

After 78 days of air operations, through most of which Task Force Hawk was present and operating, its own operations against Serb forces, the Yugoslav government finally agreed to sign the MIlitary Technical Agreement ('MTA'). As part of this agreement, the American government finally agreed to the entry of NATO peace enforcement troops into Kosovo. That act, on 10 June, ended Operation Allied Force.

Following immediately upon the conclusion of Operation Victory Hawk, elements of V Corps’ 1st Armored Division and 1st Infantry Division moved into the province of Kosovo as part of NATO’s peace enforcement mission under command of the Allied Forces, Central Europe, Ready Reaction Corps. The American contribution to Kosovo began, or KFOR, was a reinforced brigade operating as Task Force Falcon in Operation Joint Guardian. The corps had planned to send the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, as the American component of the five multinational brigades under ARRC control. The force, under command of the assistant division commander, Brig. Gen. John Craddock, and carefully trained the base force, the 3rd BCT, in a series of exercises in the months prior to the deployment, completing a mission rehearsal exercise in February still involved in a combat maneuver training center rotation in the late spring, when the deployment order was issued. The need, however, to place American units in Kosovo as quickly as possible led to a change, and V Corps framed orders to deploy combat units then in Albania as the lead elements of Task Force Falcon. Thus, most of the force came from those elements of the 1st Armored Division and 82nd Armored Division that had been stationed at Tirana, Albania. The military technical agreement with Serbia was signed on 9 June, and the 3rd Battalion, 158th Aviation, from the 2nd Armored Division, deployed immediately in a seven-county operation immediately in a seven-county area, one in the eastern part of the sector and one in the west, which his units then occupied and built up as Camp Bondsteel and Monteith. By 14 June, all of Task Force Falcon was in Kosovo. As the brigade was built up, the corps deployed four force packages into the area of operations. The first was the Task Force Falcon units and the 26th MEU, and they were followed in the first 30 days of the operation by the main body from Germany, and then by the multinational unit forces that came under TF Falcon control—a Greek mechanized infantry battalion, a Polish airborne battalion, and a Russian airborne task group.

The brigade took up peace support operations immediately in a seven-county area, performing the same kinds of tasks that Task Force Eagle had carried out earlier in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As 1st Infantry Division forces arrived, the Task situation. Leaders of every rank began to bring groups of soldiers together and took them up the bluffs, where they assaulted German defenses from the rear and thus, at last, began to effect a beachhead. Gerow devised the landing schedule to follow on waves of troops to reinforce those portions of the shore where progress was possible and coordinated naval gunfire to support the assaults to take the five draws that led away from the invasion beach.

“Thank God for the Navy,” Gerow told Bradley, reporting that destroyers had literally sailed into the surf as little as 800 yards from the beach to fire directly at bunkers and machine gun positions that were holding up the attack. By mid-day, valor and determination had at all levels had resolved a dangerous situation. In the early afternoon, the corps beachhead and all five exits from the beach were secured and weary soldiers had begun to move inland. That afternoon, the corps established its first command post in Europe five hundred yards from the front line just below the bluffs along the beach at Le Rouquet. The first day of war had been a sobering one. In 15 hours of combat, V Corps had taken approximately 2,500 casualties.

The corps landed the remainder of the two assault divisions and the 2nd Infantry and 2nd Armored Division took them up as the following days. During the next two weeks, the corps gradually expanded its lodgment on the Normandy coast, taking the fighting into the hedgerow country behind the beaches. A British 21st Armored and the 2nd South Armored, and the 3rd and 4th Armored Divisions, and the 1st and 2nd Armored Divisions, and the 3rd and 4th Armored Divisions, pushed westward into Normandy and the Brittany Peninsula. The 2nd Cavalry Group, attached to the 2nd Armored Division, and the 3rd Armored Division moved through to secure crossings over the river Seine to the south. On 30 August, the corps provided troops for a formal victory parade, marching the 28th Infantry Division down the Champs Elysées, through the city, and directly into Argentan pocket. V Corps, which had been holding on the left flank of the breakthrough, received orders to help close the trap at the town of Coutances. In four days of heavy fighting between 17 and 21 August, the corps cooperated with British and Canadian units to prevent the Germans from escaping to the east. Although the pocket was closed late two late to encircle all the enemy that had originally been in the vicinity of Falaise, the corps ultimately captured elements of six armored and seven infantry divisions, a total of more than 40,000 prisoners. The battles around the Falaise Gap marked the end of German resistance west of the Seine River. The road to Paris was open, and First Army ordered V Corps to liberate the city.

On 25 August, the 2nd French Armored Division, the 4th Infantry Division, and the 102ndCavalry Group captured Paris without firing a shot. While the French troops assumed control of the city, the 4th Infantry Division marched through to secure crossings over the Seine River to the south. On 30 August, the corps provided troops for a formal victory parade, marching the 28th Infantry Division down the Champs Elysées, through the city, and directly into Argentan pocket.
across France that brought U.S. forces to the borders of Germany by the end of September. One week after leaving Paris, and 26 years after its previous visit there, V Corps captured Sedan. Three days later, it liberated the city of Luxembourg, and on 10 September, although the advance was considerably slowed by shortages of gasoline, the corps closed on the German border. Lt. Gen. Courtney Hodges, the First Army commander, gave V Corps permission to conduct a reconnaissance in force, and Gerow sent the 4th and 28th Infantry Divisions, the 5th Armored Division, and the 102nd Cavalry Group forward to attack the Siegfried Line. In the early evening of 11 September, the 85th Reconnaissance Squadron of the 5th Armored Division sent a dismantled patrol into Germany itself, in the vicinity of the town of Wallendorf. The 85th Recon was therefore the first allied unit to enter Germany.

The Siegfried Line campaign and the Battle of the Bulge

Anticipating that the Germans would resist fiercely on the Rhine River line, the Allies planned a two-pronged attack that would cross the river north of Koblenz and south of Mainz, setting up the conditions necessary to take the industrial Ruhr valley. The V Corps mission was to move through the frontier fortifications and seize key terrain in the vicinity of Aachen, and particularly the dams over the Roer River, as part of the First Army attack into the Siegfried Line and the Huerigen Forest. The corps sector was 42 miles in width, extending from St. Vith in the south to the vicinity of the city of Luxembourg in the north. When the attacks began on 14 September, Hodges, the First Army commander, also directed V Corps to protect the flank of VII Corps, which was leading the First Army attack into Germany.

The Siegfried Line, constructed before the German attack on France in 1940 as the Westwall, was not as formidable a barrier as it had been. Many of its guns had been removed and emplaced on the Atlantic and Channel coasts of France, and the fortifications themselves had fallen into disuse over the intervening years. and asked the United States to augment its air defenses. Under command of the V Corps deputy commanding general, Maj. Gen. J. B. Burns, Joint Task Force Shining Presence deployed to Israel with an Army force built around Task Force Panther, which involved three MEPS from the batteries of the 5th Battalion, 7th Air Defense Artillery. The task force arrived deployed out of Germany within 48 hours of notification and arrived in Israel on 12 December. It immediately conducted joint exercises with Israeli air defense forces before moving to firing locations at various key spots in Israel. The battalion remained in Israel until the coalition bombing campaign ended on 20 December, and then returned to Germany over the next day and a half.

Iraq remained at the center of events. Allied determination to enforce the United Nations resolutions concerning the “no-fly zone” in northern Iraq in January 1999 appeared likely to provoke some response from Saddam Hussein. Since allied aircraft were operating from Incirlik Air Base in Turkey, it appeared possible that Iraq might fire missiles at the Incirlik area to punish Turkey for providing the bases from which allied aircraft were launched. Thus, the government of Turkey asked the United States for assistance.

On 15 January 1999, the Joint Chiefs of Staff gave USAREUR the mission of sending a Patriot task force to Incirlik. USAREUR passed the mission to V Corps and its 69th ADA Brigade, which dispatched a MEPS from the 6th Battalion, 52nd Air Defense Artillery that arrived in Turkey by 20 January. Task Force 6-52 came under control of Operation Northern Watch upon arrival in Incirlik and swiftly set up a battery location that the soldiers steadily improved. When the MEPS could not come from Battery D, with elements of the Headquarters and Headquarters Battery and the 549th Maintenance Company. When it became clear that the Northern Watch mission would not be short, the battalion established a rotation of one using 6-52. On 29 August, V Corps marched on in the direction of Sedan, joining in the race the day before. On 29 August, V Corps marched on in the direction of Sedan, joining in the race
the town of Galtür, Austria, 40 kilometers northwest of Innsbruck, and blocked all the roads to the site of the disaster. Some 12,000 vacationers were trapped in Galtür and surrounding villages. The Austrian Government asked Switzerland, Germany, and the United States to help airlift the stranded vacationers from the avalanche area. Ten aircraft and a ground support package from the 5th Battalion, 158th Aviation, arrived in Austria on 24 February and started relief operations the next day. After flying 186 missions and lifting 3,119 passengers out of the affected area, the task force completed its operations on 26 February and returned to Germany.

Air defense deployments

After the end of the Persian Gulf War, air defense artillery units in USAEUR were reorganized. In the process the 32nd Army Air Defense Command, which had commanded all Army air defense in theater, was returned to the United States, and all but two of the air defense artillery brigades were likewise returned to other stations. As part of that reorganization, the 69th ADA Brigade was assigned to V Corps, and it was soon reconfigured from standard corps air defense artillery brigade organization to become a pure Patriot missile brigade.

In June 1992, Operation Southern Watch officially began, under the aegis of United States Central Command, and specifically of Joint Task Force South- west Asia. Operation Southern Watch monitored and controlled airspace south of the 33rd Parallel in Iraq, in accordance with United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq at the end of the Persian Gulf War. As part of that operation, the United States dispatched a regular rotation of Patriot missile battalions to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to secure the airspace. The battalions of 69th ADA Brigade assumed that mission on three occasions, each time on a six-month rotation, after 1992. The 6th Battalion, 52nd Air Defense Artillery, went to Southwest Asia from March through July 1996 and again from June through November 1998, and the 5th Battalion, 7th Air Defense Artillery had the mission from December 1999 through May 2000.

Tactical developments that began in USAEUR’s 94th ADA Brigade and that were completed by 69th ADA Brigade made it much easier to deploy a Patriot fire unit on short notice. The Minimum Engagement Package that the two brigades developed involved only two launchers, one engagement control station, a radar and associated power unit, 12 missiles, a small amount of ancillary equipment, and 55 soldiers.

The point was that the MEP could be transported in a single sortie of four C-5 aircraft. The battalions in the corps’ 69th Air Defense Artillery Brigade rigorously rehearsed the MEP concept and developed detailed plans for packaging and loading its equipment. The concept was soon tested.

In December 1998, Sadaam Hussein again prevented United Nations weapons inspectors in Iraq from doing their work to make certain that the Iraqis possessed no weapons of mass destruction. In response, the United States and its allies threatened to conduct air strikes in what became Operation Desert Fox. The Israelis feared that the Iraqis might fire their Scud missiles at Israel in retaliation, ing years. Still, the Germans rapidly moved troops in to roccupy the defenses, and the corps could count on facing prepared concrete pillboxes and sophisticated antitank barriers known as “dragon’s teeth,” fields of concrete pyramids as much as two meters in height. Furthermore, the Germans had sown extensive minefields, particularly of the dreaded 8 mines and “Schuh” mines, some of which had too little metal to react to mineweeding devices. Again, the infantry-artillery cooperation that had been a hallmark of V Corps operations in World War I and that had been empha-
sized during the Louisiana Maneuvers, offered a solution to cracking the Siegfried Line. The artillery brought up 155-mm self-propelled howitzers and fired them directly at the pillboxes the infantry had identified. At a rate of one shell, one pillbox, V Corps gradually opened a way through the German defenses. After two weeks of intense fighting, V Corps broke through the Siegfried Line in its sector.

Then, on 29 September, Gerow received orders to suspend his attack, turn his sector over to VIII Corps, and break through another section of the Siegfried Line on a narrow front of 12 miles near Monschau, Belgium, with the objective of reaching the German town of Schleiden and continuing toward the Roer dams.

By that time, the Germans had heavily reinforced their defenses, and V Corps could make little progress. Operations were temporarilysuspended during the month (17 September through 16 October) that the 1st Allied Airborne Army and British XX Corps tried to cross the Rhine at Arnhem, Holland, in Operation Market Garden. On 2 November, with the weather by then considerably harsher, V Corps resumed its attack, sending its 28th Infantry Division into the dense Huertgen Forest to seize the key terrain around Vossack and Schmidt. Later acknowled-
ging the attack to have been a mistake, Gen. Omar Bradley characterized it as some of the toughest fighting in the European theater. Although the 28th Infantry Division met with early success, the corps was unable to make good use of armor and tactical air support. Heavy German counterattacks through 20 November pushed the division out of Schmidt and the surrounding villages, inflicting losses of more than 6,000 men killed, wounded, and missing, in one of the most costly actions of the entire war. Although a failure, the attack on Schmidt did have a positive aspect, in that it relieved pressure on the VII Corps front, from which the German withdrawals units to meet the 28th Division’s attack.

Worse fighting was yet to come, as First Army directed V Corps to support the VII Corps attack deeper into the Huertgen Forest. On 21 November, the corps began an attack that was even costlier in terms of casualties than the debacle at Schmidt, but which was more successful. Fighting in bad weather and dense forests, the corps captured Huertgen and progressed in the direction of the Roer River by the 27th of the month. Controlling the ridge overlooking the Roer valley by 7 December, V Corps began an attack with four divisions abreast four days later. The 99th, 2nd, 8th, and 78th Divisions were making good progress when the German counterattack in the Ardennes brought allied offensive operations to a halt.

Beginning on 16 December, the Battle of the Bulge, one of the greatest and certainly most decisive battles of World War II, was also the single greatest battle that the United States Army fought at any time in the entire war. In it, the Army reached maturity. The judgment of Hugh Cole, who wrote the definitive official history of the battle, continues to ring true today. In the Ardennes, he wrote, “the mettle of the American soldier was tested in the fires of adversity and the quality of his response earned for him the right to stand shoulder to shoulder with his forebears of Valley Forge, Fredericksburg, and the Marne.” It was not just the success of the Army as an institution that sustained Cole’s evaluation. Above all, it was the fact that the great battle was won by American soldiers in small groups, often isolated and usually without knowing the overall situation, who fought tenaciously, with enormous determination and great courage, in the face of odds that almost always appeared overwhelming. Obsti-

nately, the American soldier fought on when there seemed to be no hope, and his stand in the Ardennes confounded Hitler’s hopes and the plans of the German high command in Germany’s last, desperate bid to win the war.

The weight of the German offensive, which had been prepared in great secrecy and with exceptionally good operational security, fell in the VIII Corps sector, although a secondary thrust threatened the inexperienced 99th Infantry Division of V Corps. Gerow ordered a tactical withdrawal, and the 99th Division slowly pulled back about 12 miles to the vicinity of Monschau, where it established defensive positions along Eilensop Ridge with the other three divisions, right
at the boundary with VIII Corps. The German Sixth Panzer Army, attacking on a front 15 miles wide, rapidly gained success on its left flank, with divisions advancing 30 miles from the starting line, but was stopped early by the tough American defense at Monschau, on its right flank. The artillery at Monschau literally stopped a German attack by itself, and in the V Corps sector, the 99th Infantry Division Artillery helped that green unit to hold its ground for two days, until the V Corps artillery on Elenborn Ridge began to carry the burden. The weight of fire was tremendous: on the night of 17 December, for example, one V Corps infantry battalion was covered by a defensive barrage of 11,500 rounds. By the end of the Battle of the Bulge, V Corps artillery controlled 37 field artillery battalions behind Elenborn Ridge. With the stand of V Corps at the twin villages of Krikitel and Rocherath and along Elenborn Ridge, the entire German attack fizzled out. Thereafter, the German center of gravity shifted away from the crucial roads that the V Corps defense had denied the attackers and focused on the only remaining alternative, Bastogne.

While the dramatic events of the siege and relief of Bastogne were unfolding further to the south, V Corps secured the northern shoulder of the Bulge against German attacks. In the course of four weeks of fighting, the corps held its ground, so restricting the width of the front that the Germans could only use one Panzer army, instead of two, and disrupting the delicate timetable of the enemy advance. The cost of success was high, though, with V Corps casualties for the Battle of the Bulge amounting to almost 8,000 in its four divisions. Gerow left the corps to assume command of Fifteenth Army on 15 January 1945, and Huebner, until then in command of the 1st Infantry Division, succeeded him as corps commander just as it became clear that the German counteroffensive was over. In the following two weeks, the corps resupplied and reorganized itself to resume its attacks into Germany. In the center of the line for the general offensive that began on 30 January, V Corps pushed through the Siegfried Line recaptured terrain it had been forced to give up a month earlier. Fighting in deep snow and difficult terrain, the corps once again marched in the direction of Schmidt and the Roer River dams, finally taking the town on 5 February and securing the last of the dams late on 9 February.

### The Rhineland and Central Europe campaigns

With the capture of the Roer River dams, the way was open for VII Corps to move on to Germany and for the First Army to close on the Rhine. Because the Germans had committed the bulk of their reserves to their Ardennes offensive, only limited force was available to resist the allied attacks of the late winter and early spring. V Corps marched toward the Rhine on 10 March and spent the next 12 days supporting III Corps as it built and extended its bridgehead over the Rhine at Remagen. Then the corps crossed the river and pushed out of the bridgehead, swinging north along the eastern bank of the river to capture the town of Limburg by 26 March and the city of Koblenz and its fortress of Ehrenbreitstein in the next day. Following up those successes, the corps continued to drive up the Lahn those detachments, remained in Heidelberg and commanded normal corps operations. With one division serving as the larger part of the 25,000 American troops in Bosnia and the bulk of the Corps Support Command serving in Hungary, the troops-to-task ratio was well below that to which units in Germany were accustomed. Despite that, normal corps operations, including training rotations and NATO exercises, continued without interruption throughout the duration of the Bosnian deployment.

Corps (Main) and TF Victory planned the redeployment of 1st Armored Division to Germany at the end of its year in Bosnia. A brigade of the 1st Infantry Division entered Bosnia in December 1996, as a covering force to facilitate the withdrawal of 1st Armored Division, and then the Big Red One assumed the TF Eagle mission as of 21 December. On that date, Operation Joint Endeavor ended and the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) ceased operations. Immediately, Operation Joint Guard began, with 1st Infantry Division committed to the new NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR). Subsequently, 1st Armored Division continued to support operations in Bosnia, having included not just brigades of the two divisions assigned to V Corps, but also the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment from the U.S. As the operation proceeded, other units from the United States, including the 1st Cavalry Division, took up the peace enforcement mission in Bosnia in six-month rotation with 1st Armored Division and 1st Infantry Division. Aside from its direct involvement in the many operations in Hungary and the former Yugoslav republics, V Corps played a central role in preparing and training the forces that carried out the NATO missions. The process began in the summer and fall of 1995, when the corps conducted Exercise Mountain Shield for a proposed Southern European Task Force mission in Bosnia, and continued with the Mountain Eagle series of exercises. Mountain Eagle exercises, planned and conducted by the corps and its major subordinate commands, trained each unit that assumed the SFOR, and then SFOR, mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

### The Beirut Air Bridge and other aviation missions

After the 1984 bombing of the U.S. embassy in Beirut, Lebanon, the Department of State decided that it could no longer safely use the Beirut International Airport, and the Department of Defense stationed a helicopter detachment on Cyprus to take diplomats, diplomatic papers, and a limited amount of cargo into and out of the embassy. In 1986, what was then the 12th Aviation Group took over the mission, which V Corps units retained from the time of the Persian Gulf War until the mission’s end in 1998. The Executive Flight Detachment stationed at Royal Air Force Station, Cyprus, became a standing mission of the 5th Battalion, 158th Aviation, of the 12th Aviation Brigade, and specifically of that battalion’s Company C, 7th Battalion, 158th Aviation. The UH-60 flight detachment was equipped with special navigation equipment and other systems required by the mission and one platoon of soldiers were rotated on a 60-day basis with the other platoons in Co. C, 7/158th. In addition to being qualified for long over-water flights, the flight detachment also was qualified to land on the deck of a U.S. Navy ship operating in the Mediterranean. Because 5/158th Aviation was at the same time maintaining a second Black Hawk company in support of the Operation PROVIDE COMFORT relief operations in northern Iraq, management of limited aircrew and critical aviation maintenance skills became a continuing issue.

The standard mission from Cyprus to Beirut and back consumed seven hours from briefing through debriefing, and the detachment planned to fly up to 15 on-call missions every month. The mission profile required the standard two-aircraft mission to land at the embassy after a low-altitude final approach, remain on the ground for a very brief period, and abort the mission if fired upon. As far as could be determined, no flight detachment aircraft were ever fired at in the years the Beirut Air Bridge was in operation. In 1996, with a general easing of tensions in Lebanon, a civilian service replaced the Army flight detachment and the platoon returned to Germany.

Another aviation mission attracted a good deal of publicity when one of the heaviest snowfalls in Europe in recent years caused an avalanche that engulfed
ron, 1st Cavalry, led the 1st Armored Division across the Sava River bridge and into a NATO peace enforcement operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a mission that no one would have envisioned only a few years before, in a place that the Cold War-era planners would have considered highly unlikely.

It was not only a great physical distance from the Fulda Gap to the Posavina Corridor, but it was also a great conceptual distance from the philosophy of corps operations that underlay the notional conventional armored battle in NATO’s central region, to the philosophy of corps operations that enabled V Corps to serve in 1996 as what its commander, Lt. Gen. John N. Abrams, called an “expeditionary corps.” That shift in focus was five years in the making, and the deployment for Operation Joint Endeavor represented the maturing of a more versatile forward-based corps that had drawn on the experience of the out-of-sector operations that it had undertaken since the end of the Persian Gulf War.

At first purely a force-provider for the operation, V Corps quickly became more deeply involved. Because the ARRC was the headquarters commanding the operation in Bosnia, the 1st Armored Division, configured as Task Force Eagle, fell under ARRC command. USAREUR determined that it was necessary to create a National Support Element to carry out all of the various Title 10 responsibilities for U.S. forces in Bosnia, however, and therefore created a headquarters known as USAREUR (Forward), which it located in Taszar-Kaposvar, Hungary.

The USAREUR (Forward) headquarters was under command of Abrams, who wore the second hat of Deputy Commander, USAREUR (Forward), and drew heavily on V Corps to provide his staff. V Corps planners had already written the deployment plan that was incorporated in the USAREUR operations plan, and many of those officers moved to Hungary to supervise creation of the Intermediate Support Command. All of V Corps’ separate brigades sent units or elements to Hungary or, as required, to Bosnia, to manage the support requirements for Task Force Eagle. The Initial Entry Force began arriving in Bosnia by 16 December 1995 and paved the way for the 1st Armored Division deployment, which reached into Bosnia from the base area in Hungary on 1 January 1996. Thereafter, USAREUR (Forward) and its NSE Support Command. Meanwhile, V Corps headquarters had to constitute another general staff, this time in Germany. Task Force Victory, under Maj. Gen. Walter Yates, the Deputy Corps Commander, and using the general staff of V Corps Artillery, commenced operations at Wiesbaden Air Base. TF Victory commanded the rear detachments of deployed units and non-deploying units and managed the replacement flow into Hungary and Bosnia. The Corps Main headquarters, much depleted by all
excessively large number of soldiers that support units alike and hampered training. Personnel shortages plagued tactical resources went chiefly to maintain that.

The 82nd Airborne Division was virtually the only maneuver unit was the 82nd Airborne Division. The Army charged V Corps with the mission of preparing and modifying contingency plans, but the headquarters spent the majority of its time in inspecting units of the General Reserve throughout the country; training units of the reserve, civilian components, and West Point cadets; preparing to activate the reserve, civilian components, and outside of Germany, and by using
every imaginable means of transportation.

On 25 February 1994, Department of the Army announced a decision that had been reached in 1993 to move V Corps from Frankfurt am Main to Heidelberg. The move was a logical extension of the continued drawdown of forces in Europe. As a general principal.

The headquarters move

V Corps. USAEUR signed the implementing arrangement for the bi-national corps with the Federal Republic of Germany in 1993, and V Corps signed the Technical Arrangement with II Corps on 14 June 1994. Allied to the evolving exercise focus, corps planners also began considering the new problem of displacing the corps to the region in which it would give battle. The first step in that process was a concept known as the Advance Support Echelon, in which the corps placed its combat units in a corps marshaling area and then laid down combat service support behind a cavalry screen and under an air defense umbrella, subsequently passing the maneuver units through the combat service support and into battle. That was an important first step away from what one corps planner called “logistics to four decimal places,” and toward the uncertainties of supporting a deployment outside of Europe and in an immature theater of operations.

The headquarters reconstituted itself as the Army commander, Lt. Gen. Alvin C. Gillem, intended to use to train the headquarters and V Corps troops in simulated combat conditions, and to provide the utmost in practicable training in troop movement and field operations for battalion and regimental combat teams.

Besides a small aggressor group and various supporting units from corps troops, the major participant was the 82nd Airborne Division. The 3rd Infantry Division and the 31st Infantry Division

The essential element of the move was that it had to be so planned, organized, and executed that it was possible for the headquarters to continue to function throughout the 18 months the process would take. Normally, units scheduled to move were permitted to stand down while that move was taking place. Because V Corps was the only tactical formation remaining in the theater at the time of the move, USAEUR could not afford to grant the corps that luxury. Thus V Corps conducted the move, with all of its complications, across the background of a sustained high tempo of training and deployments. By December 1994, the move had been largely completed, and the building was returned to control of the German government in early 1995.

The element of the move plan was that the headquarters would operate simultaneously in both Frankfurt and Heidelberg while the move progressed, in order to provide the continuity of supervision required by corps operations. The success of the move planning may be gauged from the facts that corps training and deployment missions continued without interruption, and that the move of the headquarters went largely unnoticed by both subordinate and superior headquarters, neither of which noted any decrease in the capability of the staff or the efficiency with which the corps operated.

Operations Joint Endeavor and Joint Guard

In many ways, the NATO deployment to Bosnia-Herzegovina was for V Corps, the culmination of the preceding five years of preparation. When V Corps tanks and fighting vehicles moved during the winter of 1989-1990, they still invariably marched along the familiar paths from their garrisons in Germany to their units’ general defense positions along the inter-German border, or else to ranges where crews honed their skills for conventional, heavy-force battle. The soldiers followed a routine that had hardly changed in more than three decades of Cold War duty in Germany. On New Year’s Eve in 1995, however, the M-1A1 Abrams tanks of the 1st Squad
of very specific missions, and in a way that reflected the most current operational context in which the unit would have to adapt. Forging a partnership with USAREUR’s Seventh Army Training Command, V Corps drew upon the expertise at the Garrison Command in Wiesbaden, Germany for detailed planning, and engaged other major units and agencies in a way that accommodated the rapidly changing conditions there. The mission of Mountain Eagle exercises proved a very successful way to match the unit with its mission. The Mission Rehearsal Exercise thereafter became a normal tool for training V Corps task forces.

As time went on, the V Corps force structure introduced new variables into the planning task forces went before taking up the Able Sentry mission in Macedonia, but which took their final form when V Corps began sending troops to Bosnia-Herzegovina as part of Operation Joint Endeavor at the end of 1995. The Mission Rehearsal Exercise was a carefully planned and structured exercise that rehearsed units for operations in a specific theater of operations, in pursuit of the eventual decision to station more powerful forces in Europe. By 1946, most American military units in Germany had been reorganized as conscriptable forces. Intended to regulate the American occupation zone, conscriptable forces were lightly armed and structured for police work. The opening days of what came to be known as the Cold War thus saw the movement of major Army units from the United States to Germany. Among them was V Corps, which moved from Fort Bragg to Bad Nauheim in 1951, and to the I. G. Farben building in Frankfurt am Main.
early the next year. As early as 1948, some of the con-
stable units organized as combat troops, forming three
armored cavalry regiments, including the 14th Armored Cav-
ey that eventually fell under V Corps control. With the section
of the Army in Europe definitely changed from occupation to defense, additional
forces were quickly assigned. Seventh Armored was moved to
24 November 1950 to command the units that rapidly began to arrive in
In Operation Gyroscope, the Army replaced entire divisional
forces, rather than individual battalions. Here the 3rd Armored Di-
vision arrives in Bremerhaven, Germany to join V Corps.

Divisional reorganizations

A new Department of the Army plan approved on 1 July 1955 changed the way
replacements were handled in Europe. Instead of an individual replacement
system, whole units, together with family members, were exchanged between
Europe and the Continental United States in what was known as Operation Gyro-
scope. The expectation was that such a replacement concept would improve
unit morale and effectiveness, as well as producing cost savings. Each major unit
rotation to Europe was scheduled for a 33-month tour. In Operation Gyroscope I, 1
26 May to 27 September 1955, the 10th Infantry Division replaced the 1st
Infantry Division in the V Corps order of battle. Likewise, from May to June 1956,
the 3rd Armored Division arrived in Operation Gyroscope III to replace the
4th Infantry Division. The 8th Infantry
Division, later to come under V Corps control, arrived in October 1956 as another
rotation. Four years after beginning Gyroscope, Department of the Army decided to return to an
individual replacement system, with the large unit rotations ending on 1 September
1959.

In Operation Gyroscope, the Army replaced entire divisional forces, rather than individual battalions. Here the 3rd Armored Division arrives in Bremerhaven, Germany to join V Corps. The structure of the divisions themselves underwent profound change in those years as well. The Army in the 1950s assumed that future war would inevitably be nuclear war, and Department of the Army in 1956 developed a plan to reorganize divisions to be not only more survivable on a nuclear battlefield, but also to be more flexible. The new organization was intended to give the division mobility, dispersion, superior intelligence, and communications. Under the Pentomic concept, the division did away with the combat command, the equivalent to the brigade echelon of command, as well as the regiment and the battalion, instead organizing its companies into five battle groups, each commanded by a colonel. The assumption was that there would be no fixed lines on such a battlefield, and the division had to be organized to fight in every direction at once. Conceptually, the battle groups would concentrate to take an objective and then rapidly disperse, so as not to present a profitable target for the enemy to hit.

To enhance mobility, the goal was to make all parts of the division air-trans-
portable. Conventional weapons were also improved, and the division was given its own nuclear artillery. By 1958, the Corporal rocket, with range up to 75 miles, was available, and the Redstone, with a range of 160 miles, forces reached operational units. The Lacrosse, a short-range missile for close support of the infantry, was brought into the inventory. The corps had its own nuclear cannons in the 280-mm gun, of which Seventh Army had six battalions. Each battle group was a self-contained force capable of independent operations. Specifically organized to enable it to absorb new equipment, the Pentagon division soon received the M-41 rifle in the standard NATO 7.62mm caliber, the 7.62mm M60 machine gun, the diesel-powered M60 tank with 105mm cannon, and the lower-silhouette M-113 armored personnel carrier that, together with helicopters, gave the infantry high mobility. Smaller than a regiment, the battalion task force was a unit that could deliver nuclear fires. The 155mm howitzer battalion was reorganized to retain two 155mm batteries, but substituted one 8-inch howitzer battery and one Honest John rocket battery for the other two. Supporting units were generally made to fit the task and provided as needed. The Pentomic division was smaller, at 13,748 officers and men, than the prior triangular divisions.

Following testing, the Army converted all of its divisions to the Pentomic organization between 1958 and 1960, including the 8th Infantry Division and VII Corps in Germany. Problems with the Pentomic division quickly became apparent. The 8th Infantry originated from the 3rd Infantry Division, and the commander of the 3rd Infantry Division had the conduct of the campaign the 8th Infantry指挥官 of the 3rd Infantry Division had the conduct of the campaign the 8th Infantry Division was to conduct.

Changes in training, organization, and operational techniques

Not only operations, but also training, changed during those busy years, as the
corps was alerted for the mission and arrived in Mogadishu by 3 January, 1993. Advance elements of the 10th Mountain Division, a team of six air assaults on 28 December and thereafter flew medical evacuation, combat service support, and administrative missions for the 10th Mountain Division through the beginning of March, when the main body began to redeploy to Germany. The task force officially disbanded on 5 April 1993.

**Operation Support Hope**

Another civil war in Africa, this time in Rwanda, was the occasion for the next V Corps out-of-sector deployment. By April 1994, millions of refugees from the fighting had fled across the border into Zaire, and cholera and other diseases were causing deaths totaling around 1,000 a day in the refugee camps around Goma. One of the principal problems was a shortage of potable water. The United States agreed to take part in the humanitarian relief operations across the border, and therefore set up a forward operating base in Zaire through which to channel food, medicines, and other relief supplies, and created Joint Task Force 51 under the commanding general, U.S. Army Europe, to run the operation in Africa. V Corps provided forces to JTF 51, based in Entebbe, in what became a very swiftly evolving situation. Calling upon the 3rd Corps Support Command, the corps in July deployed a water purifica-
tion unit to Zaire. The platoon had the capacity to produce 3,000 gallons of water at each of three sites, store 60,000 gallons of water at the production site, and distribute water at eight forward water supply points, each of which could store 15,000 gallons. In July, the corps deployed an engineer earthmoving platoon from the 94th Engineer Battalion to Goma. One of the principal problems was a shortage of potable water. The United States agreed to take part in the humanitarian relief operations across the border, and therefore set up a forward operating base in Zaire through which to channel food, medicines, and other relief supplies, and created Joint Task Force 51 under the commanding general, U.S. Army Europe, to run the operation in Africa. V Corps provided forces to JTF 51, based in Entebbe, in what became a very swiftly evolving situation. Calling upon the 3rd Corps Support Command, the corps in July deployed a water purifica-
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**Task Force Able Sentry**

On January 6, 1994, V Corps assumed the Berlin Brigade the mission of providing an infantry battalion to the United Nations-Protective Force in Macedonia. The UNPROFOR mission was unique in UN history of providing a peacekeeping force before hostili-
ties erupted, with the intention of preventing fighting—in that case, between the former states of Yugoslavia: Serbia, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, generally referred to as Serbia, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, generally referred to as Macedonia. V Corps deployed an infantry battalion to Macedonia. The V Corps battalions manned the northeastern sector of the border between Macedonia and Serbia, with the Nordic Battalion (a composite battalion of Swedish, Norwegian, and Finnish) gaining observation posts to their left flank. The basic plan was to alternate the mission between infantry battalions of the 3rd Infantry Division and the 1st Armored Division. During the December, 1994, to May, 1995, rotation, the character of the operation changed. Because a measurable degree of stability had been assured, the United Nations renamed the deployed force the UNPREDEP, or United Nations Preventive Deployment. The peace enforcement mission was unique for combat arms soldiers, and there was at that time no validated doctrine to guide them as they prepared for duty in Macedonia. To make up for the deficiency, training exercises prior to deployment drew on lessons learned by previous battalion rotations. As time went on, leaders down to squadron level went to Macedonia on brief orienta-
tion tours—or “right seat rides”—before their units arrived for duty. Training for dismounted peacekeeping operations also required changes in the way soldiers and their leaders thought. There were a number of problems inherent in changing the mindset of an infantry battalion from its traditional mission to one of peace-keeping. Fundamentally, peace enforce-
m ent missions stood normal combat operations on their heads. In patrolling, for example, the object was not to move quietly and unseen, but specifically to be seen. Weapons were not carried at the ready, but were often carried at sling points, with the muzzle downward, when patrols went through towns. Most importantly, the soldiers were not there to fight, but to observe, monitor, and report the conditions along the border to the United Nations command. Soldiers of the Berlin Brigade experi-
enced the most austere conditions of any battalion rotation in Macedonia. Because each succeeding battalion worked hard to improve conditions, the amenities the soldiers enjoyed improved substantially the triangular division to task organize for different missions. More directly, however, the United States soon lost its monopoly on tactical nuclear weapons, on which Pentomic operations were based. More importantly, the United States Army came to realize that tactical nuclear war was almost certainly not a viable concept, and that indulging in any kind of tactical nuclear exchange would probably lead to a strategic nuclear war. Beginning, therefore, in 1961, although delayed in Europe until after the resolu-
tion of the 1961 Berlin Crisis, the Army converted to a different model for the operation of its divisions. The Reorganization Objectives Army Divisions, or ROAD Divisions, returned the Army to the triangular division organization, this time with three brigades that resembled the World War II combat commands in flexibility and adaptability, and particu-
larly in their ability to command whatever mix of units was needed for a given mission. The ROAD division, to which V Corps converted in 1963, could fight either a nuclear or a conventional war and was powerful enough for sustained offensive operations. The division was mechanized in that it mounted its infantry in armored personnel carriers. The division had two brigadier generals as assistant division commanders, one charged with directing the maneuver elements and the other with the logistical support. Beyond that, the maneuver brigades, the division had an armored cavalry squadron that included an air cavalry troop, a signal battalion, an engineer battalion that had a bridge company, an aviation battalion, a military police company, a robust division support company, and a division artillery with three battalions of 105mm howitzers and a composite battalion of 155mm guns and each howitzers. The Army established the standard ROAD infantry division with eight mechanized infantry battalions and two tank battalions, though that organization varied widely, particularly in Europe, where the Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces were so richly provided with armor. The armored division, by contrast, was organized with six tank battalions and five mechanized infantry battalions. In the early years of the ROAD reorganization, the designation “mechanized division” indicated that a division had seven mechanized infantry battalions and three armored battalions, though that was a distinction that soon became lost, except as the divisions in Europe were con-
trasted to the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions in the United States and the lighter 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii. All ROAD divisions were larger than Pentomic divisions and had at least twice the artillery firepower. By early 1964, both of the divisions in V Corps were settled in the new ROAD organization.

**Defense of Western Europe**

On committed to the defense of Western Europe, V Corps experienced no real change of mission for more than three decades. To describe the corps’ opera-
tions for any given year between 1952 and 1990 was therefore essentially to describe operations for every year of the Cold War. The Victory Corps assumed responsibility for conducting United States Army Europe, operations plans for the general defense of Germany from any attack by the Warsaw Pact forces. That portion of the general defense plan that pertained to the corps was precise and oriented the staff’s attention and thinking toward the east, and toward means of countering threat from that direction. The V Corps sector was roughly 50 miles in width and focused on the Fulda Gap, one of several natural avenues of

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**Figure:** Tank gunnery remained a principal focus of V Corps during training during the Cold War. Here, the 3rd Battalion, 12th Infantry, tests its firing skill.
In the early years of the Cold War, American leaders thought that an attack on western Europe was imminent... For almost 40 years, V Corps kept itself ready for that eventuality.

In the 1960s, V Corps deployed to Korea and Vietnam, where it played a significant role in the conflict. In 1967, the corps was involved in the Battle of Ia Drang, a crucial battle in the Vietnam War, where it demonstrated its ability to conduct a successful armored offensive.

In 1973, V Corps was deployed to West Germany as part of the Allied forces, preparing for the possibility of a Soviet invasion. The corps underwent significant changes during this period, including the introduction of new equipment and tactics.

In the 1980s, V Corps played a key role in the deployment of troops to Europe as part of the NATO response to the Soviet threat. The corps was involved in various exercises and operations, including the operation Provide Promise in Somalia in 1992.

In 1990, the corps was again deployed to Europe as part of the response to the Gulf War. V Corps played a crucial role in the liberation of Kuwait, leading the 1st Armored Division as it advanced through the desert to meet the Iraqi Army.

In 1992, V Corps was again deployed to Europe, this time to participate in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia. The corps conducted a successful operation to provide humanitarian assistance in the country, leading to the collapse of the Somali government.

In the 1990s, V Corps continued to play a key role in NATO operations, including the deployment of troops to the former Yugoslavia as part of the UNPROFOR mission. The corps also conducted operations in Hungary and other Eastern European countries as part of the peacekeeping missions.

In the 2000s, V Corps was involved in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, where it played a significant role in the coalition forces. The corps continued to adapt to the changing security environment, including the rise of terrorism and the need to conduct counterinsurgency operations.

In conclusion, V Corps has played a crucial role in shaping the modern military, adapting to the changing security environment, and playing a key role in shaping the future of the United States Army.
After the Cold War

The Persian Gulf War

Just as Americans began to think the threat of a major European war was at last a thing of the past, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait demonstrated that the collapse of the Warsaw Pact did not necessarily mean that the “new world order” would be a peaceful one. In November 1990, U.S. Army, Europe, sent a corps to Saudi Arabia to take part in Operation Desert Shield and, later, in Operation Desert Storm. Partly because V Corps had just had a change of command, USAREUR selected VII Corps headquarters for the job. The Jayhawk Corps was, however, a composite of V Corps and VII Corps units. The Victory Corps sent its 3rd Armored Division and some battalions from the 8th Infantry Division along with VII Corps, because the Spearhead Division was well advanced in its modernization process and was largely equipped with Bradley Fighting Vehicles. Even before VII Corps moved out, V Corps received orders to send its 12th Aviation Brigade to Southwest Asia. The corps then took on the mission of helping VII Corps deploy out of Germany. The corps provided additional equipment and ammunition to VII Corps and assumed control of those VII Corps troops — 23,482 of them — who did not deploy to Saudi Arabia. Units across V Corps gave up soldiers and equipment to get the deploying units up to 100 percent strength. In all, V Corps sent 26,878 soldiers to the Persian Gulf. Once the deployment was complete, the corps began training replacement squads, crews, and sections in armor, infantry, artillery, and engineer skills, and trained individual ready reservists from the United States in the same skills. In case the war in the desert turned out to be a long and costly one.

While VII Corps was waging its war in Southwest Asia, Lt. Gen. David M. Maddox kept V Corps focused on other possible missions that might arise. Political instability in eastern and central Europe made the situation on NATO’s periphery a risky one, and V Corps had to remain able to react swiftly if the need arose. Consequently, throughout the fighting in the Persian Gulf, V Corps trained hard, keeping its units at a peak of readiness. Once the war was over, the corps concentrated on recovering soldiers and equipment from Southwest Asia and continuing the drawdown process that had just been getting underway when the Persian Gulf War began. By the end of 1992, V Corps was the only remaining corps in Germany, and had reorganized to command the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, the 8th Infantry Division (soon to be re-flagged as the 1st Armored Division), and the 3rd Infantry Division, as well as a number of separate brigades. Immediately, the first of many out of sector missions sent V Corps troops out of Germany again. The operation was successful and the division returned to Germany.

Operation Provide Comfort

In the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War, Saddam Hussein’s army began a series of attacks on its internal Kurdish population, an action that mobilized many civilian refugees to the northern part of the country, where Iraq shared a border with Turkey. In April 1991, reacting to a presidential order for the armed forces to assist in an international humanitarian relief action for that displaced group, the commander-in-chief, Europe, activated Joint Task Force Provide Comfort at Incirlik Air Base in Turkey, under the command of Lt. Gen. John Shalikashvili, the deputy commander-in-chief. The U.S. Army component of JTF Provide Comfort was drawn from USAREUR. Task Force Bravo, commanded by Maj. Gen. Jay Garner, the deputy corps commander, deployed to Turkey starting on 13 April, with the self-deployment of Task Force Thunderhorse, drawn from the 4th Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. Very quickly, every major command in USAREUR became involved, with the heaviest deployments coming from V Corps units. Many troop units were involved, but the major deployments came from the corps’ aviation units, which assumed the mission in rotation after it became evident that the deployment would be a long one. The 4th (Combat Aviation) Brigade of the 3rd Infantry Division, the initial command and control element, was replaced by the 11th Aviation Brigade in December 1991. The peak deployment involved 2,043 soldiers in the first phase of relief operations. By late 1992, the number had fallen to no more than 51, and the numbers of soldiers diminished steadily thereafter.

Operation Positive Force

Meanwhile, political and diplomatic developments further to the south created the context for another V Corps mission. To ensure the security of recently liberated Kuwait, U. S. Central Command had, upon the request of the government of Kuwait and the approval of the President of the United States, left the 1st (Ready First) Brigade, 3rd Armored Division, behind to occupy assembly areas as the theater reserve, provide a continued U.S. presence, and combat power of the divisions through the fielding of more powerful combat vehicles and helicopters. Division 86 reorganization began in V Corps with the 3rd Infantry Division, and involved fielding the M-1 tank and the M-2 Bradley fighting vehicle to complete the division structure and equipment that existed at the end of the Cold War. On 15 September 1994, the 4th Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, inactivated in Wesches, to complete the Division 86 reorganization in the corps.

In the early years of the Cold War, American leaders thought an attack on western Europe was imminent, a belief that conditioned the American response to the war in Korea, where the Army sent National Guard divisions, rather than regular units, in early fighting in the war. Consequently, the Army maintained in Europe units at the highest possible state of readiness. As time went on, Army planners came to believe that a Warsaw Pact attack in Germany was increasingly less probable, but that it remained the greatest of all possible dangers to American national security if it ever materialized. For almost 40 years, V Corps kept itself ready for that eventuality. In doing so, the corps’ watchword remained readiness, and in the opinion of many Cold War veterans, the Army in Europe was well prepared, and V Corps and VII Corps in particular, was the most highly trained and ready part of the entire service.

Vigilance and preparedness for war

Life in V Corps focused on the eternal round of garrison and field training round, and the battalions moved from garrison to war. Winter maneuvers became an annual event, but in October 1963, Operation Big Lift, which brought the 2nd Armored Division from Fort Hood to participate in the annual exercise, set a new model for the scale of the event. V Corps, then under command of Abrams, was responsible for running Big Lift, which had a political purpose as well as a military one. President John F. Kennedy wished to demonstrate, in the aftermath of the 1961 Berlin confrontation, that the United States was determined to defend Europe. That exercise was also a rigorous test of the concept of positioning equipment in Europe that arriving troops could use. In 1967, the United States announced plans to withdraw 28,000 troops, roughly two divisions, from Europe in 1968. To demonstrate its continued commitment to NATO, despite that drawdown, the U.S. agreed to a large-scale force deployment of not less than three brigades of a single division to Europe in an annual exercise. Thus was born REFORGER — the Return of Forces to Germany exercise — which drew on the experience of Big Lift, and which became one of the most enduring symbols of the Army in Europe during the Cold War. REFORGER not only tested the ability of conventional forces to fight in a conventional war scenario, while simultaneously testing the force projection capability of the American military establishment, but it also remained a demonstration of American determination to preserve the freedom of the event.
Corps during the Cold War was a major military provocation,” began on January 1969. Thereafter, V Corps participated in each of those annual exercises. In Winter exercises, the corps validated general defense and war plans and various administrative measures that supported those plans. Other exercises helped resolve questions about how best to cooperate with the NATO allies, and V Corps troops regularly went to the field with, or in conjunction with, French, Belgian, Dutch, British, Canadian, and German units to become familiar with those nations’ equipment, organization, communications, and tactical doctrine. Still other exercises tested United States Army, Europe, operations plans. For most Cold War veterans, however, one of the dominant recollections of duty in Germany was the periodic and unannounced readiness test, when all soldiers were recalled to their units, generally in the middle of the night, and the units moved out to their general defense positions in accordance with a strict timetable that permitted no variance and admitted no excuses for failure. The ringing of a telephone in the middle of the night was, for many, the most enduring night was, for many, the most enduring memory. The Cold War was a continuous modernization of equipment. The Warsaw Pact threat defined the requirements for new tanks and armored personnel carriers, and the corps steadily received the newest and most capable weapons the United States could produce. The centerpiece was naturally the tank, but maneuver doctrine, particularly after the publication of succeeding editions of Field Manual 100-5, and especially the version that outlined the tenets of AirLand Battle, demanded the upgrading of every category of military equipment. Thus, for example, the M-113 Armored Personnel Carrier replaced earlier equipment, and the M551 Sheridan light tank replaced the M-114 cavalry scout vehicle in the cavalry regiment. In turn, the M-3 Bradley scout vehicle replaced the Sheridan. The Lance missile replaced Honest John and Sergeant field artillery rockets. Each of those weapons was replaced by still more modern equipment, thanks to increased funding in the second half of the 1980s. By the end of the Cold War, V Corps’ cavalry regiment, two divisions, supporting artillery, and other arms all had, or were in the process of receiving, fighting equipment that defined the state of the art. M-1 and, eventually, M-1A1 tanks replaced the fleet of aging M60 variants, while the M-2 and M-3 Bradley infantry squad and cavalry scout vehicles replaced the venerable M-113 armored personnel carrier. Upgrades in cannon artillery were matched by fielding of the Multiple Launch Rocket System. Similarly, the UH-60 Black Hawk utility helicopter and AH-64 Apache attack helicopter replaced the aging UH-1 Iroquois and AH-1 Cobra aircraft. Throughout the decades after 1952, V Corps stood in the center of the NATO line, literally and figuratively the keystone of the defenses of western Europe. Unlike the corps’ previous assignments, that one turned out to have involved no great battles. The Cold War was nonetheless a period of enormous stress and years of apprehensive and watchful waiting. Occasionally, war seemed to come closer, sending V Corps troops up to the border in times of crisis. The Hungarian revolt of November 1956 was one such occasion. More serious still was the East German decision to close the border in Berlin in August, 1961, and the accompanying Soviet decision to encircle Berlin with combat divisions in support of the East German action while the German Democratic Republic built the Berlin Wall. Similarly, in October 1973, the Army in Europe moved to the field during the state of alert that was ordered at the outbreak of the Arab–Israel War. In addition to threats of war, V Corps soldiers were also subjected to personal attacks through the 1970s and 1980s. The Red Army Faction exploded bombs at V Corps headquarters and at the Terrace Club on the headquarters complex in May 1972, again in June 1976, and yet again in June and July 1982. Officers’ clubs in Hanau, Gelnhausen, and Bamberg were bombed in June 1942, a year that saw the largest number of terrorist incidents (68) ever directed against American soldiers in Germany. Finally, in November 1985, a car bomb exploded at the Frankfurt post exchange, injuring 35 people. V Corps soldiers and their families lived under such threats for a dozen years. When the Warsaw Pact collapsed in 1989 and both the Berlin Wall and the inter-German border fence went down, it shortly became clear to everyone in Europe that the Cold War was not only over, but had actually been won. The cost had been principally in national treasure, rather than in lives, as in America’s earlier wars. The end result of many years of V Corps training, readiness, and intense effort, the conclusion of the Cold War was not, however, the end of V Corps’ missions in Europe. Almost immediately, veterans of Cold War service became involved in attempting to bring calm to regions on the periphery of western Europe where the demise of communist systems had left instability and insecurity.

The Iron Curtain, as seen at Fulda. During the Cold War, the border between East Germany and West Germany might also contain tank or vehicle obstacles, watch towers, dog runs and even minefields.