In March 1982, senior-level delegations from the U.S. and Germany met to discuss the mutual benefits inherent in the MRP. As a result of this meeting, a working group was tasked to identify problems that could result from implementing the MRP. They reached agreement on the technical and administrative aspects of the plan, but not on how the plan is to be funded.

During 1983, we will continue to hold MRP discussions with the Germans aimed at developing cost-sharing plans acceptable to both countries.

This program, subsequently titled the Master Restationing Plan, envisioned correcting the malpositioning of U.S. troops in West Germany to (1) achieve a more effective forward defense and (2) remove these forces from inadequate facilities and urban areas where they could not maintain military preparedness without significantly inconveniencing the German people. The plan ultimately envisioned divesting U.S. Army, Europe, commanders of all except mission-related responsibilities for training and combat readiness.

Under the plan, the United States sought German funding for the construction of facilities for 28 battalions on three U.S.-controlled locations. The plan stalled, however, primarily because of congressional expressions that West Germany share the estimated construction costs in excess of $1.2 billion. West Germany was willing to provide real estate and pay for some infrastructure but insisted that construction of military facilities be a U.S. responsibility.

According to the State Department, although the Germans were positive about the plan’s concept, overall they viewed repositioning as a massive and politically sensitive issue whose implementation would present financial and environmental difficulties. According to DOD officials, the United States was able to correct some of the original malpositioning concerns by funding limited Master Restationing Plan-related station changes and constructing some facilities itself.

The United States also sought to obtain base operation and maintenance support through contracts with a German government agency or commercial organization on a completely reimbursable basis. By relieving U.S. forces of base support obligations in peacetime, U.S. Army, Europe, could concentrate solely on its primary mission of combat readiness. Although in the 1970s U.S. forces had been successful in obtaining contracts for base support at two U.S. facilities, West Germany showed no further interest in expanding the concept. In addition, the German government expressed concern that the provision of base support by a German agency would considerably increase the size of its bureaucracy.

In addition, U.S. forces have sought German government financing for modifications to U.S.-controlled facilities so that they would conform to German environmental pollution abatement standards. Although the United States recognizes its responsibility to ensure that it complies with these standards, it considers pollution abatement at host nation-owned, U.S.-operated facilities to be a host nation responsibility. Moreover, most West German pollution abatement standards have resulted from legislation enacted after these facilities were originally placed at U.S. forces’ disposal. Although West Germany has not provided funds to help U.S. forces meet these standards, U.S. forces have attempted to comply to the extent possible by, for example, designing all new con struction to meet German environmental standards.