AIR DEFENSE 1956/57

Section I - Command Problems

Over-all Control of Antiaircraft Weapons
Throughout 1956 the over-all responsibility for the control of U.S. air defense in Europe constituted a major problem. CINCUSAFE wanted his command to be designated as the single U.S. air defense planning agent to work with SACEUR and the Commander, Twelfth Air Force, appointed as the U.S. air defense commander in Central Europe. CINCUSAREUR maintained that USAFE and USAREUR should be jointly responsible for air defense planning within areas of U.S. interest. Moreover, since missile units would be largely wasted under the existing air defense procedures an integrated air defense plan with realistic rules of engagement was needed before the NIKE battalions' arrival in Europe.

In an effort to solve the air defense problem, US CINCEUR appointed a joint committee to contact the various headquarters and devise common policies on rules and priorities of engagement, command structures, etc.

In the study that it prepared, this committee recommended, among other things, that operational control of all Seventh Army nondivisional antiaircraft artillery units be assigned to the Commander, Twelfth Air Force, who would be assisted by a joint air defense staff. An a result, US CINCEUR created the interim joint air defense staff to evaluate and implement the recommendations of the study. In addition, in October 1956 US CINCEUR directed CINCUSAFE to nominate a deputy for Air Defense (Designate) as head of the above-mentioned joint air defense staff, while CINCUSAREUR was to designate the assistant deputy for air defense. Both component commanders were to furnish on call a small number of officers for the initial staff that would serve as a nucleus for later expansion into a permanent staff.

The Proposed USAREUR AAA Employment Plan
At approximately the same time that word was received of US EUCOM' s intention to place Seventh Army's nondivisional AAA units under the operational control of the Air Force, USAREUR was informed of the new Army reorganization plan that would eliminate its divisional antiaircraft battalions. If implemented literally, these two actions could have deprived the Seventh Army commander of any control over his means, thereby seriously limiting Seventh Army's air defense capability. Any aerial attack in Central Europe undoubtedly would be accompanied by ground action. Since Seventh Army -- the only force screening the SHAPE retaliatory bases from such ground attacks -- would not be able to defend itself against a potential atomic air attack, the airbases might be overrun in a very short time. Furthermore, Seventh Army had to retain the capability for its own antiaircraft defense in the forward combat zone in order to protect its organic atomic delivery systems and support units. Without AAA defense for the movement of troops between areas and through defiles, the essential tactical mobility of Seventh Army would be severly restricted.

To preserve Seventh Army's antiaircraft defense capability and at the same time make proper provision for a defense of fixed installations, CINCUSAREUR in November 1956 proposed a realignment of the limited air defense means available. Two AAA groups, five 90-mm gun battalions, and two AA operations detachments would be placed under USAREUR headquarters. The 34th AAA Brigade and the other antiaircraft units would remain under Seventh Army. To more clearly delineate crew of responsibility, USAREUR intended to establish a Seventh Army Rear Air Defense Boundary, which was to be located initially on the west bank of the Rhine River and subsequently moved as the situation dictated.

The five 90-mm gun battalions mentioned above, of which four were scheduled for conversion to NIKE surface-to-air missile units during FY 1958, would be allocated to the static defenses west of the Rhine River in the Kaiserslautern and Bitburg-Spangdahlem-Hahn areas. Pending conversion to NIKE, these battalions would provide low and medium altitude air defense of US EUCOM's first two priority areas. Two self-propelled automatic weapons (AW) battalions, five Skysweeper, and two 90-mm gun battalions would be allocated to the mobile defense of the Seventh Army east of the Rhine and for the defense of the Rhine River bridges. Since the two self-propelled battalions were not suitable for defense of area targets, they would be employed to replace the existing divisional AA battalions upon completion of the reorganization process. The five Skysweeper battalions would provide low altitude defense of Seventh Army's atomic delivery means, major headquarters and other critical installations east of the Rhine and would assist in the defense of the Rhine River bridges. After conversion to NIKE, the two 90-mm gun battalions would be stationed east of the Rhine to defend Seventh Army units and the Rhine bridges against either air or ground attack. All these AAA units would be sufficiently mobile to displace with Seventh Army in forward, lateral or retrograde mavements and would protect the army forces wherever they were deployed.

On 28 November 1956 CINCUSAREUR recommended that the US EUCOM air defense study be modified to reflect this reallocation of AAA units before the implementing order was given. US EUCOM, however, decided to withhold specific comment until the USAREUR proposals could be studied thoroughly and referred to the interim joint air defense staff. The interim joint staff not only considered CINCUSAREUR's proposed AAA employment plan but prepared four reports, three of which contained divergent Army-Air Force views concerning the organization of a permanent joint air defense staff, the rules of antiaircraft engagement, and the use of available antiaircraft artillery forces. Only on the question of the utilization of four additional NIKE battalions did the Army and Air Force elements of the interim joint staff reach agreement.

The Draft of the US EUCOM Air Defense Directive
In February 1957 US CINCEUR made an effort to resolve the Army-Air Force conflict within the interim joint air defense staff. A US EUCOM air defense directive was drafted whose stated purpose was to establish the most effective employment of air defense weapon or combinations of weapons, while guaranteeing maximum possible freedom of operational action to all elements of U.S. forces involved. Any air defense plan adopted by US EUCOM had to support SACEUR's Emergency Defense Plan, which required that all friendly atomic storage sites and the airbases from which atomic retaliatory attacks could be launched be protected against enemy atomic air attacks. Since primary consideration had to be given to defending these areas, the EUCOM directive delegated responsibility for the air defense of Central Europe to the Commander, Twelfth Air Force, who was to be assisted by a joint air defense staff -- provided by CINCUSAFE and CINCUSAREUR -- which would function at Twelfth Air Force headquarters.

Air defense priorities were established as follows: the Kaiserslautern complex, the Bitburg-Spangdahlem airbases, the Rhine River bridges, and the Hahn Air Force base. Five 75-mm gun battalions, seven 90-mm gun battalions, seven AW battalions, four all-weather interceptor squadrons, and four day-fighter squadrons were available to defend these areas. According to the draft plan, USAREUR would be required to place its seven 90-mm and five 75-mm Skysweeper battalions under the operational control of the Commander, Twelfth Air Force, who would use them for air defense on a full-time, continuous basis. These units would not be assigned any other mission, nor would they be redeployed without prior approval of the air defense or theater commander. They would, however, be employed under Army command. One 75-mm and four 90-mm gun battalions would be deployed in the Kaiserslautern area; two 90-mm and two 75-mm battalions would protect the Bitburg-Spangdahlem airbase areas; one 90-mm battalion would be deployed at the Hahn airbase; and two 75-mm battalions would be allocated to defend the Rhine River bridges. When NIKE missiles replaced the 90-mm guns, consideration would be given to reassigning the 75-mm battalions. The remaining two nondivisional AW battalions and the five divisional AW battalions would be responsible for the local defense of Seventh Army units. If the Department of the Army reorganization of divisions eliminated the organic AW battalions and failed to provide corps and/or army combat support counterparts, the use made of the AA units would be reexamined. However, according to the most recent information six AW battalions would be retained in Europe even after the divisional reorganization.

Upon becoming available the six NIKE battalions would be deployed to US EUCOM-approved sites; upon becoming operational, they would assume their full-time air defense role under the operational control of the Commander, Twelfth Air Force. If four additional NIKE battalions were received, the first would be used for the defense of the Hahn airbase area and the next three for the air defense of Army logistical installations and the Air Force main operating bases in the Verdun-Nancy-Metz (France) complex.

USAFE was to make its four all-weather interceptor squadrons available for air defense on a similar full-time basis without assigning them any other missions. The four day-fighter squadrons and an Air Force tactical contrl group would be available only on a part-time basis to permit their use on other missions that might be of overriding importance at the time.

a. USAREUR's Reaction. CINCUSAREUR objected to the US EUCOM draft air defense plan, stating in effect that the plan violated military principles by depriving the Seventh Army commander of all his organic air defense weapons larger than 40-mm, even though he would have to engage an enemy with considerable air superiority and with an ample number of atomic weapons. Further, the draft directive did not recognize that the Seventh Army had such high priority AA defense missions as protecting atomic delivery units and special weapons support forces. Lastly, the draft plan violated Army regulations in depriving the army commander of the full air defense control of his area.

To deprive the Seventh Army commander of all but a six self-propelled AW battalions of extremely limited effectiveness for protecting his forces in the combat zone might have serious implications, especially in view of the Air Force's obvious inability to prevent low altitude attacks against troops in the forward areas. Ideally, Seventh Army ought to have 19 battalions of antiaircraft artillery, both automatic weapons and Skysweepers, to provide the necessary low altitude protection of the field forces, particularly the atomic delivery units. For this reason, not less than 12 battalions -- preferably 9 Skysweeper and 3 automatic weapons -- would have to be placed under Seventh Army control in the forward areas. (A corresponding request for this number had been approved in a new troop basis.) Seventh Army's 5 Skysweeper battalions would have to be retained for local defense, and 4 additional battalions should be transferred from the United Kingdom in exchange for 4 AW battalions that could then be inactivated. Such a change would provide Seventh Army with the most up-to-date equipment, give the Army forces an all-weather air defense capability, and result in a personnel savings of approximately 900 spaces. US CINCEUR, however, did not favorably consider CINCUSAREUR's request on the grounds that the available AA units were insufficient for the protection of the high priority atomic retaliatory air bases. Moreover, because of their lethal capabilities, any Skysweeper battalions transferred from the United Kingdom would of necessity be placed under the operational control of the commander responsible for air defense. The reliability and suitability of the Skysweeper as a weapon in a forward defense area, where frequent movements would be necessary, left much to be desired. Much of Seventh Army's air defense in the combat zone would have to be provided by passive means.

CINCUSAREUR adhered to the position taken in November 1956 and requested the draft air defense directive be revised to provide for an allocation of five 90-mm gun battalions for the defense of priority installations. He also asked that the remaining Seventh Army AA units constitute the ground forces' organic local defense means, to be employed as directed by the Seventh Army commander in accordance with the existing tactical situation. The army commander should also be given the authority to establish AAA weapons fire areas into which friendly aircraft would not fly without prior clearance. In these areas the firing units would be free to engage any aircraft not identified as friendly. This would offset the inability of the Air Force to provide adequate early warning and timely identifications and would prevent, by interception, the delivery of air attacks against troops in the forward areas.

b. The Proposed Deployment of Conventional AAA to U.S.-controlled Facilities.
Upon being advised that the acquisition of real estate for conventional AAA weapons sites around priority installations should not be undertaken until NIKE sites had been acquired, US EUCOM on 25 March 1957 requested CINCUSAREUR for information on the consequences of redeploying the 75-mm and 90-mm weapons to U.S.-controlled properties in the Kaiserslautern, Bitburg-Spangdahlem, Hahn, and Rhine bridge areas. A study forwarded by Seventh Army in April showed that the proposed deployment would permit only a very poor air defense capability; in no case would the optimum defense desired be closely approached. Such a redeployment would draw the battalions so near the center of the vulnerable area that the possibility of engaging hostile aircraft beyond a bomb release line would be very remote. Except for the protection that could be afforded the air bases against dive bombing, U.S.-controlled real estate around the vital areas was either too limited or too poorly situated to permit the establishment of an effective, all-around antiaircraft defense. Furthermore, 6 of the 7 assigned 90-mm gun battalions would be converted to NIKE equipment and moved to temporary or permanent sites, from which active defense of the priority areas would be possible. To deploy these battalions to the site before the receipt of the missile equipment might hamper the conversion program and interfere with site construction.

The real deterrent -- the lack of sufficient ground space -- would be felt especially at the Bitburg, Spangdahlem, and Hahn air bases where all the available U.S.-controlled areas were within the confines of the air installations. If the air defense units took up some of the airbase space, they might interfere with Air Force operations. In addition, the costs of installing communications and of construction revetments, on-site troop billets, and other necessary facilities would not be commensurate with the degree of air defense protection that would be realized. This matter was to be coordinated with USAFE before any further planning was undertaken; USAREUR took no further action during the remainder of the fiscal year.

c. The Final US EUCOM Position.
After having studied CINCUSAREUR's comments on the US EUCOM draft air defense directive, Deputy US CINCEUR concluded that no change in the theater air defense concepts outlined in the draft directive was justified. To be effective, air defense had to be properly organized, the necessary operating procedures had to be devised, and available forces had to be so used as to meet the over-all requirements of the theater, rather than those of any one service element. The future use of the unconverted 90-mm gun battalion and the 75-mm battalions could be reconsidered after the 6 NIKE battalions programmed for USAREUR became operational. On the basis of these conclusions the draft air defense directive was submitted to US CINCEUR for approval, after which the permanent joint air defense staff would be established, AAA units would move to on-site positions, and communications would be established. The air defense draft had not been approved by the end of the reporting period.

The USAREUR AAA Reorganization plan
Three factors were of importance in the realignment of certain air defense responsibilities within the USAREUR area proposed in May 1957. First, in a memorandum published on 26 November 1956, the Secretary of Defense provided guidance to US CINCEUR by clarifying the roles and missions of the military services in air defense. The memorandum enunciated the principle that in overseas areas, the U.S. theater commander should normally assign responsibility for air defense to an air component commander, with the other component services participating appropriately. Under this arrangement, the field Army commander would continue to be responsible for his own local defense employing organic means. Other Army air defense units would carry out point defense missions under the air component commander, while Air Force units would carry out the area defense missions. Army Regulation 525-50, also published in November 1956, amplified the memorandum by defining the Army commander's role in air defense in the combat area. By limiting the amount of outside control, the Army regulation preserved a measure of autonomy in the employment of Army air defense weapons.

The second major factor was the requirement inherent in the Army's basic missions according to which the Army was to provide antiaircraft defense for all military services and their facilities. In accordance with this requirement, US CINCEUR had established an integrated priority list of Army, Navy, and Air Force installations to be defended. USAREUR, in turn, had prepared a NIKE deployment plan which US EUCOM had approved. In essence, this plan provided for siting 4 NIKE battalions to protect the Kaiserslautern complex and the Bitburg-Spangdahlem airbases, all of which were situated west of the Rhine River. 2 NIKE battalions would be sited east of the Rhine to protect essential bridges between Mainz and Karlsruhe. The last factor that influenced the USAREUR AAA reorganization plan was that US EUCOM had not recognized Seventh Army's mobile forces as an entity competing with fixed installations for high priority air defense considerations. In its new plan USAREUR attempted to provide the necessary defense of the priority fixed installations, to afford a measure of protection to Seventh Army's mobile forces, and to comply with directives from higher headquarters.

According to the air defense reorganization concept, USAREUR retained the west bank of the Rhine River as the boundary dividing the combat zone into a "forward area" to be defended by Seventh Army, in which were situated substantially all field forces and vital Seventh Army installations and a "rear area" to be defended by the 32d AAA Brigade, in which USACOMZEUR and USAFE forces and static facilities predominated. Army air defense operations would be conducted in accordance with SHAPE air defense procedures.

Upon the outbreak of hostilities (Phase 1), Seventh Army would provide air defense for all U.S. forces and vital installations east of the Rhine, giving initial priority to the protection of the Rhine River bridges and the special weapons delivery units. In the event of an alert the 32d AAA Brigade would transfer the 1st AAA Group with 2 90-mm gun battalions to the Seventh Army and would deploy 3 90-mm AAA battalions for the defense of the Kaiserslautern complex, and 1 75-mm battalion each to the Sembach, Bitburg, and Spangdahlem airbases. Plans for operations after the outbreak of hostilities (Phase II) would be prepared in coordination with Seventh Army. A maximum effort was to be made toward taking such passive air defense measures as cover, concealment, camouflage, dispersal, and deception.

The advantages of the proposed realignment of responsibilities would be many. Seventh Army would be freed from Theater Army antiaircraft defense responsibilities; at the save time, it would be given command of Skysweeper battalions and NIKE units in the forward areas, even though these units would be under the Twelfth Air Force's operational control; a command structure would be created for the expansion of Theater Army antiaircraft forces into the communications zone; and the NIKE battalions deployed in the forward areas would provide the ground forces commander with required fire support. The main disadvantage was that the NIKE defense forces would be split between two brigades.

Seventh Army nonconcurred on the grounds that divided authority and responsibility would jeopardize operations of the NIKE defenses and would complicate coordination and reorganization in the event of movement of any defense elements across the Rhine. Further, it would also violate the Department of the Army policy on air defense. In rebuttal, the USAREUR Air Defense Division pointed out that the proposed realignment was in consonance with the departmental air defense policy to the extent permitted by the US EUCOM draft directive; therefore, its adoption would place the Army in a strong position to rebut the directive. CINCUSAREUR approved the proposed realignment of air defense responsibilities shortly after the close of the reporting period.

Department of the Army Concern over US EUCOM Concepts
At the close of the fiscal year, Department of the Army concern over the US EUCOM air defense concepts was expressed by the Army Chief of Staff in a letter to CINCUSAREUR which questioned two aspects of the US EUCOM draft directive. The first was the contemplated establishment of a quasi-joint air defense control structure in the combat zone that would remove most of the field army commander's organic air defense means from his control. The second objectionable aspect was the lack of Army representation at certain echelons within the proposed structure. As an alternate solution it was suggested that the Seventh Army commander or his representative be designated as an air defense sector chief under the operational control of the joint air defense commander. This approach would have the double advantage of keeping the air apace in the Seventh Army area under ground force control and conforming with a proposed SHAPE plan for air defense sectors in Enrope.

Participation in Joint Planning
a. The US EUCOM Air Defense Requirements Study.
In January 1957 the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed US CINCEUR to submit an air defense plan for his area of responsibility that could contribute to the establishment of a JCS "order of magnitude" estimate of the over-all defense requirements for all overseas areas. Representatives of USAREUR, USAFE, SETAF, NELM, and USEUCOM formed an ad hoc committee which, after having received intelligence estimates and strategic concepts from the U.S. element of SHAPE, formulated guidance for a working group, composed of officers and civilian scientists from USAREUR and USAFE headquarters. The study produced by this working group was used by US EUCOM to evaluate certain conclusions concerning the adequacy of previously stated requirements. The contents of the study are analyzed in the top secret supplement to this report.

b. U.S. Planning for Areas Outside of Central Europe.
Concurrently with the preparation of the US EUCOM requirements study for Central Europe, US CINCEUR directed USAFE to prepare a similar study for Spain, Portugal, and Morocco with the assistance of USAREUR. Although CINCUSAREUR's air defense responsibilities did not extend to this area, it was considered to the best interests of the U.S. Army that USAREUR participate in requirements planning for the area. Accordingly, one USAREUR member of the main working group was made available temporarily to USAFE headquarters.

Participation in NATO Planning
In June 1957 SHAPE forwarded to the Department of the Army and to USAREUR its draft plan for the coordination of air defenses of NATO Europe in the 1960 period with a request for comments. In essence, the plan proposed a barrier-type air defense, with surface-to-air guided missiles (SAM) defending the forward areas and manned interceptor aircraft the rear areas. Air defense sectors were to be established, and a system of control was proposed.

On 24 June the Department of the Army raised a number of specific objections to SHAPE's proposals. The draft plan man designed as a step to provide a logical transition from the current NATO posture to the more fully coordinated systems of the post-1965 period when manned interceptors would have little or no capability of meeting the threat behind the forward areas. Therefore, it was considered that requirements for that period should not be based on interceptor forces available for air defense during 1960-62. In addition, no costly aircraft control systems should be established because of the short life and marginal value of aircraft. Since restrictions on SAM fire might have to be imposed to protect the interceptors while in flight, the best solution would be to exclude interceptors from the SAM areas of coverage.

The normal fire procedure outlined in the draft plan appeared to give higher headquarters the authority to commit individual surface-to-air missiles against certain targets, a method that would seriously limit the capability of the weapon. In turn, by disseminating information on identification and on the engagement status of all targets by other SAM's to the individual batteries, more targets could be engaged and destroyed. In general, higher echelons should only monitor the actions of the SAM units; making target commitment decisions at higher headquarters would take up valuable time that the missile units could use to increase their firepower.

As to the establishment of air defense sectors in Germany, the departmental view was that the principle of wartime unity of command in the combat zone should guide any peacetime solution adopted. The commanders of field armies in Germany should control all combat forces within their areas of responsibility but an integrated air defense of the entire European theater of operations was needed, hence the proposed air defense sectors. These two requirements dictated the adoption of an organizational concept wherein the field army commander would be designated as the air defense sector commander for his area.

Section II: National Plans for NIKE Deployment in Europe

Department of the Army Planning
In April 1956 the Department of the Army had programmed 10 NIKE battalions for the U.S. Army, Europe, in FY 1958. Plans were made accordingly. Subsequent information revealed that NIKE deployments to Europe would be slower than originally planned, and in April 1957 the Department of the Army budget guidance for FY 1959 indicated 6 NIKE battalions for FY 1958, 4 for FY 1959, and 1 more for FY 1961 -- a total of 11 battalions to be deployed in USAREUR.

The Seventh Army Deployment Plan
In August 1956 Seventh Army was instructed to prepare a sound, flexible operational plan for the six NIKE battalions to be received in FY 1958, based on the assumption that the tentatively selected sites would be approved. Individual plans were to be prepared for each defended area, integrating both NIKE and conventional antiaircraft artillery units.

In September 1956 Seventh Army submitted its deployment plan for the six battalions. In brief, it called for the stationing of one NIKE battalion headquarters in Worms with firing batteries located in Wackernheim, Dexheim, Worms, and Kriegsfeld. A second battalion headquarters would be in Pirmasens with the four firing batteries in the immediate vicinity. A third battalion headquarters would be at Baumholder with firing batteries in Zweibrucken, Baumholder, Kirchberg, and at the Hahn airbase. The entire fourth battalion would be in the vicinity of the Bitburg airbase. The fifth NIKE battalion would have its headquarters in Karlsruhe with firing batteries in Germersheim, Kleingartach, Grossachsenheim, and Pforzheim. The last battalion would have firing batteries in Darmstadt, Vielbrunn, Reisenbach, and Mosbach, with the battalion headquarters to be located in Mannheim.

The proposed Seventh Army deployment plan did not provide sufficient cover for the western approach to the Kaiserslautern area. USAREUR, therefore, with the approval of US EUCOM, recommended that one site be moved from Worms to west of Kaiserslautern to strengthen the area. The radar portion of the plan also was to be amplified to include the radar set locations of 1 90-mm gun and the 6 NIKE battalions. The radar sets of 5 75-mm gun battalions and 2 self-propelled AA battalions were to be so sited as to improve the coverage and yet permit movement without seriously affecting the radar net. The plans had been completed by the end of the reporting period.

NIKE Site Acquisition

a. The Permanent Site Program.
During 1955 and 1956, the 6 90-mm AAA battalions that were to be changed initially to NIKE had been allocated for deployment after conversion in defense of the Kaiserslautern complex, the Bitburg-Spangdahlem airbase area, and the Rhine River bridges between Mainz and Karlsruhe. Twenty-four missile battery sites were selected by the 34th AAA Brigade, and 19 of these were tested by radar for suitability. The criteria for selection were achievement of maximum defense of the priority areas with the means available and, where possible, location of the sites near existing U.S. installations in order to use available facilities. Since NIKE personnel had to be ready to launch missiles at any time of the day or night, primary consideration was given to locating each site in close proximity to troop housing.

During the reporting period the 34th AAA Brigade established its requirements for the construction of essential facilities, determined the required logistical maintenance and supply support, and prepared plans to screen personnel for security and aptness. At the close of the fiscal year, training exercises had been planned for the permanent air defense sites. Moreover, NIKE standing operating procedures, to include alert requirements, minimum manning tables, and training memorandums, directives, and objectives, were under preparation.

b. Negotiations with the Federal Republic of Germany.
In January 1956 West German key officials had been briefed on plans for bolstering American air defenses with NIKE units. In accordance with the Forces convention, the over-all construction program was submitted to the Federal Republic during the following month, and by 17 May 1956 real estate requirements of the NIKE program had been submitted.

By simultaneously confronting the German Federal and Land (State) governments with U.S. real estate requirements, it was hoped that Bonn would apply sufficient pressure to expedite action on the local level. The American Ambassador, however, withheld presentation of requirements to the Bonn Government at this time, pointing out that the Land governments should first be given sufficient time to act on the matter before he approached a high-level government agency. In the event of prolonged delay in acquiring the properties, the Ambassador promised to take action.

Almost immediately the program ran into determined local opposition, especially in the Rhine Palatinate. Resistance to the acquisition of NIKE sites stemmed largely from apprehension over losing agricultural land, from the belief that the presence of the NIKE installation would increase the danger of air attack, and from widespread opposition to rearmament. The problem was further complicated by U.S. Air Force insistence that TALOS missiles be used at four of the sites. When the U.S. Embassy requested the Federal Republic to assist in overcoming state opposition, Bonn drew attention to the constitutional restrictions that greatly limited the Federal Government's coercive power.

By April 1957 only 6 of the 24 NIKE sites had been definitely acquired. Of the 24 sites, 16 were to be located in the Palatinate, 2 in Hesse, 5 in Baden-Wuerttemberg, and 1 (tentative) in the Saarland. Baden-Wuerttemberg first approved all 5 sites, but local political pressures limited final approval to only 2. Hesse steadfastly refused to approve any sites, while by May 1957 the Palatinate had actually given final approval to the acquisition of only 5 and partial approval to 3 of the 16 sites. The German representatives declared that, since opposition to the NIKE program was increasing, they would be unable to make any further commitments in the foreseeable future .

Subsequent conferences with the Land governments failed to break the stalemate, whereupon the issue was referred to the Central Accommodations Committee in Bonn. The Federal Republic was minded of its obligation under the Forces Convention to provide these sites, by whatever means necessary. Aside from the state officials' reluctance to antagonize the local population, the preelection atmosphere was a deterrent to prompt acquisition of NIKE sites. After the technical aspects as well as American public reaction to emplacement of NIKE sites in the vicinity of the larger U.S. cities was explained to the Germans, the Defense Ministry representative promised to initiate a program to inform the German public that the NIKE would be a defender of, rather than a hazard to, West Germany. The public information offices of the U.S. forces were to supply data and educational material to assist the Federal Defense Ministry in this task. In personal discussion with Minister Strauss, CINCUSAREUR outlined the U.S. position and requested assistance at cabinet level. However, not much could be achieved because the preelection controversy over atomic support and the international disarmament negotiations in London complicated the problem.

c. Plan for the Use of Temporary Sites.
Because of delays in land acquisition, planning, and construction, it was evident that permanent sites would not be available in time for the arrival of the NIKE battalions. Nevertheless, CINCUSAREUR had stated that the NIKE units would be fully operational within two months after arrival even though temporary sites had to be used. Plans were made accordingly.

When a Departmental directive stipulated that only minimum funds could be used for the temporary NIKE sites, Seventh Army was instructed to find real estate property under U.S. control or available land where the missile units could be located. Approximately 10 sites were selected by the 34th AAA Brigade, and site layouts were prepared. An estimated $600,000 was needed initially to prepare the locations, even though U.S. engineer troop units were to be used for site construction. A further estimate of costs for acquiring land and preparing these sites was to be submitted by the area commands in August 1957.

d. Construction of the First Two NIKE Sites.
(1) The Release of Funds.
In November 1956 the Department of Defense decided to withhold funds for NIKE construction pending evidence of coordinated Army-Air Force planning for the use of surface-to-air missiles. To prevent further delay in NIKE construction, US EUCOM suggested concurrent planning for both the NIKE and TALOS missiles. Since TALOS units were not programmed for Europe until FY 1960, and any delay in NIKE construction would leave U.S. forces in Europe exposed to unopposed nuclear air attacks, USAREUR wanted the construction funds to be released without further delay. The TALOS units, when made available, could be integrated into an air defense system in priority areas determined by a joint USAREUR-USAFE air defense planning committee.

In January 1957 USAREUR again requested the Department of the Army to release construction funds for two NIKE battalions, indicating that the final plans for the sites were completed and the real estate was available. On 17 January $9,700,000 was released for the construction of 8 sites for 2 NIKE battalions, whereupon US EUCOM authorized the construction of tactical facilities, to include troop housing and battalion and group headquarters. The difficulties encountered in procuring additional real estate temporarily induced the Department of Defense to withhold allocation of Military Construction, Army (MCA), funds for the next four battalions. Moreover, at the end of June 1957 a world-wide freeze was placed on all MCA programs so that no new contracts for construction could be let. The USAREUR NIKE program suffered particularly from this decision because the missile units were scheduled for early deployment. At the close of the reporting period, the Department of the Army was attempting to secure an exemption to the freeze so that the special weapons portion of the construction program could be continued.

(2) Award of Contracts.
On 18 and 23 April 1957 contracts for the construction of the first two NIKE sites in the Rhineland-Palatinate were awarded. The average cost of each site, not including the prorated share of the battalion ordnance direct support shop, was about $975,000, to be paid from appropriated dollar funds. The sites were under construction at the close of the reporting period. (See Chart below.)

The first shipment of 75-mm Skysweeper antiaircraft guns was accepted by troops of the 34th AAA Brigade in Germany on Friday, Oct 22. Accepting delivery of the first shipment for the 7th Army command was Brig Gen Frank C. McDonnell, CG of the 34th AAA Bde. The new weapons arrived at the Mainz Ordnance Depot several weeks ago where they were prepared for delivery to the troops. (The Mainz Depot serves as the central receiving point for all 75-mm guns delivered to units in Germany.)

The new guns replace the 40-mm AA weapons used by several 34th AAA Bde units.

The 75-mm gun is the Army's largest calibre automatic antiaircraft artillery weapon and is the only antiaircraft weapon with a completely integrated fire control system built on the gun. The Skysweeper automatically plots range, speed and course of an approaching target and determines where the gun must point so that a shell fired any instant will intercept and destroy the target.

It is designed for use against enemy aircraft flying near-sonic speeds at low and medium altitudes. It can also be used against moving ground targets such as tanks. The gun fires 45 rounds a minute and its built-in radar can track a 15-mile radius (the radar sweeps the sky once every 40 seconds). Its effective firing range is about four miles (more than 21,000 feet).

Components of the Skyweeper include the 75-mm gun, a radar search and track unit, a computer and power control for aiming. The only parts of the Skysweeper not mounted on the carriage of the gun are the power plant and an auxiliary sighting control.

Webmaster note:
34th AAA Bde units scheduled to receive the 75-mm Skysweeper system (1):

AIR DEFENSE 1957/58

NATO Air Defense Policy

a. The SHAPE Barrier Air Defense Concept

AIR DEFENSE 1958/59

Air Defense

a. Control
In the second half of July 1958 US EUCOM transmitted to its component commands a draft directive assigning to CINCUSAFE the responsibility for the air defense of Central Europe. All surface-to-air missile units and their tactical headquarters were to be placed under the operational control of the Air Defense Commander. In his comments to this draft directive, CINCUSAREUR asked that gun-type artillery units be kept under the operational control of Seventh Army. He also wanted to have the wartime authority to displace surface-to-air missile units, if the tactical situation necessitated such action and CINCUSAFE had not issued any redeployment orders. Finally, CINCUSAREUR asked that CINCUSAFE prescribe rules of engagement that would exploit the effectiveness of surface-to-air missile units to the maximum. More specifically, the suggested normal weapons status would be WEAPONS FREE under Warning RED or YELLOW, no HOLD FIRE orders would be issued in the Seventh Army area without the latter's concurrence. While these comments were considered reasonable, US EUCOM did not want to restrict CINCUSAFE in the execution of the mission he was being assigned. The Air Defense Commander would seek complete Army collaboration and support in exploiting the full value of the surface-to-air missile units that were being placed under his operational control. On 6 August 1958 CINCUSAFE was assigned the air defense mission as it pertained to the US European Command, pending creation of an integrated NATO air defense system. At the same time the 32d Artillery Brigade and its six NIKE battalions were placed under the operational control of CINCUSAFE. Approval of US CINCEUR would have to be obtained before any US Army unit was deployed outside of the FOURATAF area.

In anticipation of the new air directive, CINCUSAREUR had ordered the transfer of two NIKE battalions from the 34th to the 32d Brigade; simultaneously, the 34th Brigade headquarters had been reduced to a zero balance in strength. The two NIKE battalions involved in the transfer had been employed in the defense of the Rhine River bridges and the Seventh Army Commander therefore wanted to retain two Skysweeper battalions to defend the bridges. Since the bridges were protected by the operational NIKE units still in place, USAREUR determined that atomic delivery weapons units and major headquarters would be given priority for antiaircraft gun protection. At the same time Seventh Army's inadequate air defense was a matter of great concern, and the HAWK units programmed for FY's 1961 and 1962 were therefore to be deployed in the Seventh Army area, if possible.

b. HAWK Deployment
According to USAREUR's plans, four of the six HAWK surface-to-air missile battalions were to be deployed to Europe in FY 1961 and the two others in FY 1962. The air defense concept provided for siting the HAWK batteries in the forward area of the US Seventh Army so that they could complement the NIKE units by executing low-altitude strikes or forcing hostile targets up to altitudes most favorable to NIKE action. In FY 1961 a band of three rows of five HAWK batteries deployed in a checkerboard pattern would cover the most likely avenues of approach for high-priority targets flying to the west. This band was to be extended to the north and south when NATO HAWK units became available. The two battalions scheduled to arrive in FY 1962 were to be so deployed as to thicken the belt in the US zone. These plans would be subject to revision if no NATO HAWK units became available to extend the US belt. CINCUSAFE concurred in the forward disposition of the HAWK units, but preferred a thinner band with greater initial north-south extension to provide the optimum over-all low-altitude defense for Western Europe. US CINCEUR pointed out that decisions on the deployment of HAWK units would be the responsibility of CINCUSAFE as the Air Defense Commander. As HAWK units arrived, they would be placed under his operational control.

In a letter to General L.L. Lemnitzer, then Army Vice Cheif of Staff, General Hodes expressed serious concern over this air defense concept. If the field-army commander was to carry out his responsibilities, he would have to be given the authority to select sites and move units to conform to his operations. Since all conventional air defense units in Seventh Army would probably have to be inactivated to provide the spaces for the HAWK battalions, the army commander would have no means for carrying out his air defense responsibilities unless US CINCEUR revised his stand. While the concept was acceptable that HAWK units assigned to the field armies, committed to NATO, and deployed in Europe would have to conform to the air defense procedures prescribed by the regional NATO air defense commander, General Lemnitzer was asked to assure that the Seventh Army commander would be given authority to employ, position, and move HAWK units assigned for the protection of his own forces while conforming to NATO air defense procedures.

In his reply General Lemnitzer pointed out that HAWK battalions were being deployed primarily for the air defense of field-army forces; they were being provided to US CINCEUR for the air defense of NATO Europe. On the other hand, it would be unwise at this time to request the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a decision, as the weight given to the theater commander's views would most likely result in a decision unfavorable to the Army.

In a letter sent to the Deputy US CINCEUR in early December 1958, General M.D. Taylor, then Army Chief of Staff, noted the delegation of responsibility to CINCUSAFE and did not question the authority of US CINCEUR to deploy NIKE and HAWK battalions. However, he did hope that US CINCEUR and CINCUSAFE would bear in mind that the Army surface-to-air missile units planned for deployment in Europe in FY's 1961 anmd 1962 were designed for field-army use and had been justified to Congress for such use. Essentially, this justification had been based on the inadequacy of the field army's air defense, which resulted from the growing obsolescence of current field-army antiaircraft weapons. Hence, while these new weapons could be integrated into the over-all theater air defense, the requirements of the field-army commander should be given due weight in their deployment.

During the same month representatives of interested headquarters formed a working group of the AFCENT Air Defense Committee to prepare a low-altitude surface-to-air missile deployment plan for the Central Region. The plan envisioned four rows of HAWK batteries from the Kiel Canal to the Swiss border, with the westernmost row east of the Rhine River in the CENTAG zone. Six US Army HAWK battalions were to be included in the CENTAG Zone. By 30 June 1959, however, SHAPE had not approved the AFCENT plan.

The Improved HAWK system would become the major medium-range, surface-to-air missile deployed within NATO. It shows two significant improvements over the basic HAWK system: a newly developed missile and the Information Coordination Central.

The new missile featured
an all solid-sate guidance section
a larger warhead (75 kg versus 54 kg)
an improved rocket motor (M112)

The ICC provides
a digital computer for improved target data processing

The IHAWK was designed for defense of a mobile field army in combat. An important requirement for this mission was that all battery equipment be carried or towed by M-35 (or M-36) cargo trucks which were organic to the battery. (All battery equipment was also capable of being airlifted via helicopter for rapid relocation.)

Components of the IHAWK Battery:

ACQUISITION & FIRE CONTROL GROUP
Battery Control Central (BCC) - performs tactical control of the battery and each of the firing sections

Information Coordination Central (ICC) - houses IFF, communications and an ADP. This is the data processing and communications center for the battery.

The ADP (Automatic Data Processor) is the computer. It receives acquisition data from the IPAR and ICWAR and automatically assigns targets (to the launchers) on a pre-established priority basis. For critical targets that must be engaged immediately, the ADP can also fire the missile.

Improved Pulse Acquisition Radar (IPAR) (AN/MPQ-50) - this is a long range, high altitude search radar. It serves as the primary source of high- to medium-altitude aircraft detection for the battery.

Improved Continuous Wave Acquisition Radar (ICWAR) (AN/MPQ-48) - this radar is used to detect targets. It acquires targets through 360 degrees of azimuth and provides target radial speed and raw range data. The ICWAR provides for the detection of aircraft flying at the lowest altitudes in the presence of heavy ground clutter. 

Range-Only Radar (ROR) (AN/MPQ-37) - automatically provides target range measurements when the other radars are being jammed in an electronic countermeasures environment.

GUIDANCE GROUP
High-power Illuminating Radar (HIPIR) (AN/MPQ-39) - the HIPIR automatically acquires and tracks designated targets in azimuth, elevation and range. It also serves as an interface unit supplying azimuth and elevation launch angles computed by the ADP in the ICC or the ICPC for up to three launchers.

The HPIR J-band energy reflected from the target serves as a reference signal to the semi-active homing missile. (The HAWK missile "homes" throughout its flight to intercept on the energy reflected by the target.)

LAUNCHING & HANDLING GROUP
Launcher - the missile launcher (designated to fire) activates a missile, aims it into a collision course with the target and launches the missile.

Handling Equipment - the handling equipment includes the tracked loader used for storage of additional ready missiles. (During operations, depleted missile launchers can be rapidly reloaded by the tracked loader.)

TEST EQUIPMENT GROUP
The ground equipment contains built-in test equipment. The IHAWK missile is a "certified round" which requires no field test or maintenance. Field maintenance equipment is incorporated in the mobile configuration and support equipment (diesel generators, interconnceting cabels, and prime movers) are also part of the tactical battery.

Operation:

An ADP is contained in both the ICC and the ICPC (1). It provides for three modes of operation: manual, normal and automatic.

The manual mode is the same as in basic HAWK except that the tactical control officer (TCO) is assisted by the ADP. In the BCC, the TCO monitors radar data, manually selects for engagement and assigns each selected target to a firing position. The fire control operator controls the HIPIR, launcher and missile launch operations.

In the normal mode all of the operator functions are perfomed automatically with the exception that the TCO must manually accept each target designation before the automatic sequence can continue.

In the fully automatic mode the manual acceptance of individual targets by the TCO is negated. This mode is especially useful when the battery is under stauration attack or for pop-up targets.

In both normal and automatic modes, the operators monitor operations and the TCO can override automatic functions.

(1) Improved Platoon Command Post (IPCP)