Wartime Host Nation Support
US Army, Europe
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Training
Training for German reserve units is very different from that of U.S. reserve units. To understand the WHNS process one must understand the German training system.

U.S. personnel, accustomed to the "1-week-end-per-month-and-2-weeks-in-summer" approach to reserve training, are surprised by the German system. Training for WHNS units follows the same pattern used for all other German reserve units, and it is basically the same as that used successfully during World Wars I and II.

Formal, mandatory unit training occurs once every 2 years for combat units, and once every 3 years for combat support and combat service support units. This training period is normally 12 days long. Part of this period consists of unit-leader training, and it culminates with a 30-hour field training exercise. The entire unit trains together a total of 6 to 10 days. While other training takes place, such as military school courses or individual participation in other exercises, by U.S. standards, the German formal training cycle is austere in terms of time allotted.

One major offsetting factor is the universal requirement for military service. Every enlisted German reservist spends at least 15 months on active duty, and some spend up to 4 years before being assigned to the reserves. Commissioned and noncommissioned officers have from 2 to 15 years of active-duty experience.

In addition, many German reservists designated for WHNS units are already working for the U.S. Army, training for their wartime jobs every workday. These are the men of the Civilian Support Groups (CSG's), an outgrowth of the postwar Labor Service Units. The 6930th CSG is a 2d SUPCOM subordinate unit whose draft-eligible German males will be incorporated into a WHNS unit upon mobilization. This plan allows the continued use of well-trained personnel who, as reserve soldiers, would not then be subject to employment limitations imposed upon civilians. Personnel in CSG units have years of experience in highly technical fields, are familiar with U.S. procedures, and are often proficient in English; these advantages offset some training limitations.

The German system appears to work well. A recent training exercise for a WHNS Lance escort battery supporting VII Corps proved that in spite of the training cycle, WHNS units can operate successfully with U.S. units. The key to maximizing training effectiveness is to ensure that a WHNS unit conducts its training together with its supported U.S. unit. This requires a serious commitment and full involvement by the U.S. unit. Lessons learned from the Lance escort battery training confirmed the need for U.S. personnel to fully brief WHNS personnel on the U.S. unit's mission. German linguists, always a scarce commodity, are vital to successful mission accomplishment, and the U.S. unit must monitor and provide feedback on effectiveness of the support provided.

Although UKdo 5 or any UKdo will not be fully fielded for 3 to 4 years, many actions can be taken now that will enhance the capability of UKdo units when they do become fully operational. The experience of 2d SUPCOM and UKdo 5 demonstrates what can be done now.

The 2d SUPCOM and UKdo 5 have established a close and proactive working relationship and thus have gained valuable insight into wartime cooperation. The staffs of both headquarters have developed a joint field standing operating procedure (FSOP). The FSOP incorporates special procedures to accommodate UKdo 5. UKdo 5 has different command and control principles, equipment, and operating procedures than those of 2d SUPCOM, which had to be taken into account in revising the FSOP.

To familiarize the WHNS unit with U.S. terms and procedures and U.S. personnel with German procedures, UKdo 5 participated in a command post exercise, Wintex-Cimex '87, alongside 2d SUPCOM units and personnel from the 167th Corps Support Command (COSCOM), 2d SUPCOM's Capstone unit. Liaison teams were dispatched to 2d SUPCOM and VII Corps headquarters, while the UKdo player cell was located with 2d SUPCOM's subordinate Active and Reserve Component units. The operational chain of command was played off-line to avoid confusing present-day with future capability. Designated layers from 2d SUPCOM medical groups and materiel and transportation staff sections provided taskings to the UKdo that mirrored those of 2d SUPCOM units. UKdo 5 staff officers conducted daily briefings in English for 2d SUPCOM personnel.

As a result of the exercise, both units became thoroughly familiar with the other's operations and gained valuable experience for future operations. The exercise also provided the opportunity for maximum interface between UKdo 5 and 167th COSCOM units, thus building operational expertise for both elements of 2d SUPCOM's wartime force -- U.S. and German reserve units. Command post exercises of this nature must be conducted as early as possible to ensure good interface and proper employment of UKdo units.

Training of UKdo 5 personnel in U.S. procedures has not been limited to formal exercises. Training has included orientation classes on 2d SUPCOM organization and missions for both active-duty and reserve UKdo personnel. M16 rifle qualification, always popular with German partnership units, assumes a particularly practical dimension for UKdo 5 personnel, as they stand a far greater likelihood of someday employing the M16 in earnest. To share lessons learned so far, 2d SUPCOM and UKdo 5 have presented joint classes to German soldiers and officers as part of the German Army's WHNS course for personnel who will serve with WHNS units.

The past year's joint implementation of the WHNS concept has yielded many valuable lessons. Not all of them, however, were what we wanted to learn. Although much progress has been made, many challenging problems have been identified that still require solution.

WHNS units are German units, organized to German TOE's, and employed in accordance with German doctrine. There are subtle differences between German and U.S. units -- differences in doctrine, training, manning, and equipping that are of no consequence when German units interface with German units, or U.S. with U.S., but which often cause a less-than-perfect match when German units must support U.S. units.

U.S. terminal transfer units, for example, will normally perform the loadmaster function for a truck unit that arrives to pick up cargo, since U.S. truck units do not have that capability. However, in the German Army, it is the truck unit, not the terminal transfer team, which determines the loading of each truck. Consequently, when a U.S. truck arrives at a German WHNS terminal transfer point neither unit will have the loadmaster capability. The same holds true for loading documentation in these units. Adjustments must be made to rectify the differences.

Similarly, functional gaps exist because German logistics doctrine does not require performance of a particular task. In U.S. ammunition supply units, the function of surveillance (ensuring ammunition stocks are serviceable and safe to use) is provided for by TOE's. U.S. units also closely manage the issue and stock accounting of ammunition. German ammunition units, on the other hand, are more austerely manned and do not perform surveillance and accountability functions in the same manner as U.S. units, nor are they trained in U.S. procedures for these tasks, given the limited training time available.

The best solution for eliminating these and other functional gaps lies in the employment of cellular logistics teams (CLT's). A CLT is a small team of U.S. functional area specialists, normally reservists, who fill the gap between a WHNS unit's capability and the U.S. requirement. Teams vary in size according to the type of WHNS unit they support. Currently, they are envisioned primarily for ammunition supply companies, POL supply battalions, and terminal transfer companies. The concept was first defined in 1984, and tentative agreement on CLT composition was reached in February 1987. The agreement was signed on 20 July 1987.

A generic mission for any CLT includes providing liaison and interface between U.S. and German WHNS units; providing U.S. workload data to German units; maintaining visibility of supplies and equipment; and reporting their status back through U.S. channels. While the CLT concept will be costly in terms of additional U.S. personnel, it offers an effective way to overcome problems relating to U.S.-German doctrinal and procedural differences. At the same time, the CLT provides a radio communications link which is U.S.-compatible.

There are also equipment differences that must be recognized and adjustments that must be made. For example, U.S. regulations require JP4 fuel to be filtered twice before being pumped to an aircraft. Consequently, all U.S. fuel trucks and storage tanks have fuel filters and separators. However, the fuel storage tanks in WHNS petroleum supply battalions are not so equipped, thus rendering them unsuited for JP4 storage. This problem is being addressed.

While the WHNS program has developed considerably since its inception in 1982, much remains to be done. The U.S. and German forces involved are breaking new ground in interoperability and mutual support, and valuable lessons have been learned that will help logistics planners make the best of this essential warfighting asset and facilitate the employment of WHNS units.

These are some key lessons that must be kept in mind by those involved in the WHNS process
Key U.S. personnel interfacing with UKdo's must understand the German language and terms.
We must give high priority to ensuring that funding is aligned with the activation schedule.
U.S. units must provide early, meaningful training opportunities for key WHNS personnel.
FSOP's must be developed, played out in command post exercises, refined, used in field exercises, and then refined again.
We must use every opportunity to build joint understanding of support requirements and the supporters' capabilities, through social, sport, command post, and field exercises.
We must build on experience gained in other U.S. and WHNS units.

Colonel William J. Flanagan (Quartermaster Corps) is commander, Defense Logistics Agency-Europe. Until June 1987, he was chief of staff, 2d Support Command (Corps), in Europe. Colonel Flanagan is an Army War College graduate and a frequent contributor to Army Logistician.

Major Thomas Schatte is civil affairs officer, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Security, Operations, Training, and Intelligence, 2d SUPCOM. As a German linguist and former chief of plans and operations, V Corps, GS, Major Schatte has had extensive experience in the implementation of the wartime host nation support program